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Abstract	  
As	   a	   prescient	   critique	   of	   telepresence	   technologies	   like	   the	   Internet,	   “The	  
Machine	   Stops”	   satirizes	   hypermediated	   contact	   and	   in	   its	   place	   valorizes	  
contact	  made	  with	  the	  fleshly	  body—so	  much	  so,	  that	  it	  fantasizes	  the	  removal	  
of	   all	   technological	   mediations	   between	   that	   body	   and	   the	   “real.”	   This	   move	  
carries	   strong	   ecocritical	   implications	   in	   its	   suggestion	   that	   all	   authentic	  
connection—whether	   between	   people	   themselves	   or	   between	   people	   and	   the	  
earth—must	  be	  corporeal.	  The	  narrator’s	  apology	  on	  behalf	  of	  “beautiful	  naked	  
man”	  (122)	  and	  his	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  robust,	  technology-­‐free	  body	  are,	  however,	  
both	  problematic.	  Forster	  appears	  to	  conflate	  nakedness	  and	  fleshly	  connection	  
with	   unmediated	   contact	   or	   “full	   presence,”	   a	   view	   that	   raises	  many	  potential	  
criticisms	   and	   questions.	   If	   the	   body	   proves	   to	   be	   but	   one	   kind	   of	   mediating	  
interface	  itself,	  then	  on	  what	  grounds	  should	  the	  mode	  of	  fleshly	  connection	  be	  
privileged	  over	   interactions	  mediated	  by	  motors,	  buttons,	  and	  video	  screens?	   If	  
all	  contact	  must	  be	  mediated	  somehow,	  does	  it	  even	  make	  sense	  to	  consider	  one	  
type	   of	   interface	   as	   “more	   authentic”	   than	   another?	   Is	   it	   right	   to	   equate	  
nakedness	   with	   freedom	   from	   technology?	   In	   this	   paper	   I	   use	   an	   ecocritical	  
perspective	   to	   explore	   such	   questions	   in	   the	   text,	   focusing	   in	   particular	   on	  
Forster’s	  depiction	  of	  technology	  as	  devastating	  to	  both	  the	  human	  body	  and	  to	  
the	  experience	  of	  space	  and	  place.	  The	  timeliness	  of	  such	  concerns	  suggests	  that	  
“The	  Machine	   Stops”	  might	   prove	   even	  more	   significant	   in	   the	   hypermediated	  
world	  of	  today	  than	  it	  was	  a	  hundred	  years	  ago	  for	  questioning	  the	  relationship	  
between	  corporeality,	  representation,	  and	  nature.	  	  
[Vashti]	  could	  see	  the	  image	  of	  her	  son,	  who	  lived	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  earth,	  
and	  he	  could	  see	  her.	  	  
“[…]	  I	  want	  you	  to	  come	  and	  see	  me”	  [he	  said]	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“But	  I	  can	  see	  you!”	  she	  exclaimed.	  “What	  more	  do	  you	  want?”	  	  
“I	  want	  to	  see	  you	  not	  through	  the	  Machine,”	  said	  Kuno,	  “I	  want	  to	  speak	  to	  you	  
not	  through	  the	  wearisome	  Machine	  […]	   I	  see	  something	   like	  you	  in	  this	  plate,	  
but	  I	  do	  not	  see	  you.	  I	  hear	  something	  like	  you	  through	  this	  telephone,	  but	  I	  do	  
not	  hear	  you	  […]	  Pay	  me	  a	  visit,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  meet	  face	  to	  face…”	  (Forster	  92)	  	  
Introduction1	  
“Only	  connect,”	  that	  famous	  wistful	   imperative	  from	  E.M.	  Forster’s	  novel	  Howards	  End	  (1910),	  
embodied	   a	   characteristically	   modernist	   nostalgia	   for	   presence,	   a	   yearning	   to	   escape	   the	  
alienating	  machinations	  of	   society	   in	  order	   to	  make	  contact	  once	  again	  with	   the	  “real.”	   In	   the	  
novel,	  Forster	  represented	  “connecting”	  largely	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  ties,	  and	  in	  particular,	  through	  
the	  attempt	   to	  establish	   intimate	   (and	   forbidden)	   relations	  between	   rigidly	  demarcated	   social	  
classes.	   One	   year	   before	   that—almost	   exactly	   one	   hundred	   years	   ago—Forster	   published	   the	  
short	  story	  “The	  Machine	  Stops,”	  a	  futuristic	  fable	  in	  which	  he	  represented	  the	  conflict	  between	  
two	  rival	  modes	  of	  “connection”	  available	  to	  the	  modern	  subject:	   the	  first	  mode	  being	  that	  of	  
machinery	  and	  tele-­‐technology,	  the	  second	  being	  gross	  bodily	  connection	  through	  the	  flesh.2	  By	  
viscerally	   demonstrating	   the	   horrors	   that	   he	   imagined	   would	   ensue	   if	   humans	   relinquished	  
physical	  contact	  in	  favor	  of	  machine-­‐mediated	  connection,	  Forster	  helped	  inaugurate	  the	  genre	  
of	  20th	  century	  dystopian	  science	  fiction	  from	  which	  such	  novels	  as	  We,	  Brave	  New	  World,	  and	  
1984	  have	  descended.	  	  
In	   “The	   Machine	   Stops,”	   Forster	   depicted	   technology	   and	   rationality	   as	   joint	   agents	   of	  
dissociation,	  dual	   threats	  severing	  us	   from	  nature	  and	   from	  our	  embodied	  human	   integrity.	   In	  
this	   respect,	   Forster	   was	   of	   course	   extending	   a	   British	   pastoral	   tradition	   that	   lamented	   lost	  
contact	  with	  an	  earth	  now	  assailed	  by	  rails,	   industry,	  and	  commerce,	  a	  shire-­‐turned-­‐wasteland	  
that	  Gerard	  Manley	  Hopkins	  had	  eulogized	  in	  the	  prior	  century	  as	  “seared	  with	  trade;	  bleared,	  
smeared	  with	  toil,”	  where	  “the	  soil	  /	   Is	  bare	  now,	  nor	  can	  foot	  feel,	  being	  shod.”	  But	  Forster’s	  
“rage	  against	  the	  machine”	  in	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	  does	  more	  than	  just	  reprise	  the	  zeal	  for	  pre-­‐
industrial	  handicraft	  and	  cottage	  industry	  expounded	  by	  Victorians	  like	  John	  Ruskin	  and	  William	  
Morris.	   Echoing	   the	   wistfulness	   for	   connection	   found	   in	   Forster’s	   other	   work,	   as	   well	   as	  
anticipating	   the	   primitivist,	   anti-­‐industrial	   themes	   pervading	   D.H.	   Lawrence’s	   novels,	   Forster’s	  
fable	  embodies	  specifically	  modernist	  anxieties	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  intuition	  versus	  rationality,	  
sensation	   versus	   ideas,	   and	   the	   fleshly	   interface	   versus	   telecommunication.3	   The	   story	   is	   also	  
distinctively	  modernist	  in	  its	  quirky	  attunement	  to	  the	  alienation	  of	  a	  technologically	  mediated	  
subject	   so	   completely	   divorced	   from	   nature	   that	   it	   doesn’t	   even	   realize	   that	   it	   is	   alienated	  
anymore.	  	  
To	   represent	   the	   dire	   consequences	   of	   extreme	   technological	  mediation,	   Forster	   extrapolates	  
forward	   from	   the	   art	   and	   science	   of	   1909	   to	   envision	   life	   in	   a	   future	   so	   rationalized	   and	  
mechanically	   mediated	   that	   nature	   and	   corporeality	   have	   been	   completely	   abjected	   from	  
human	  awareness.	  Then	  he	  asks	  us	  to	  imagine	  the	  commingled	  terror	  and	  delight	  that	  emerge	  
when	  “the	  Machine	  stops”—when	  the	  plug,	  as	  it	  were,	  is	  pulled—with	  the	  result	  that	  “getting	  in	  
touch”	   is	  made	  painfully	   literal	  once	  again	  because	  technology	  no	   longer	   intervenes	   in	  human	  
interactions	  with	  nature	  and	  with	  one	  another.	  Forster	  conceived	  his	  tale	  of	  machine-­‐mediated	  
dystopia	  as	  a	  critique	  of	   two	  specific	  cultural	  movements	  that	  had	  been	  prominent	   in	  his	  own	  
day:	   the	   first,	   aestheticism	   and	   its	   keenness	   to	   experience	   the	   world	   wholly	   through	   the	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mediation	  of	  art,	  and	  second,	  the	  techno-­‐utopian	  optimism	  of	  writers	  like	  Edward	  Bellamy	  and	  
especially	  H.G.	  Wells.	  But	  Forster’s	  story	  is	  all	  the	  more	  important	  because	  it	  succeeds	  equally	  in	  
anticipating	  21st-­‐century	  concerns,	  especially	  the	  hazards	  of	  contemporary	  cyberculture.	  	  
As	   a	   prescient	   critique	   of	   telepresence	   technologies	   like	   the	   Internet,	   “The	   Machine	   Stops”	  
satirizes	  hypermediated	  contact	  and	  in	  its	  place	  valorizes	  contact	  made	  with	  the	  fleshly	  body—
so	  much	  so,	  that	  it	  fantasizes	  the	  removal	  of	  all	  technological	  mediations	  between	  that	  body	  and	  
the	   “real.”	   This	  move	   carries	   strong	  ecocritical	   implications	   in	   its	   suggestion	   that	   all	   authentic	  
connection—whether	  between	  people	  themselves	  or	  between	  people	  and	  the	  earth—must	  be	  
corporeal.4	  The	  narrator’s	  apology	  on	  behalf	  of	  “beautiful	  naked	  man”	  (122)	  and	  his	  nostalgia	  for	  
the	   robust,	   technology-­‐free	  body	  are,	  however,	  both	  problematic.	   Forster	  appears	   to	   conflate	  
nakedness	  and	  fleshly	  connection	  with	  unmediated	  contact	  or	  “full	  presence,”	  a	  view	  that	  raises	  
many	   potential	   criticisms	   and	   questions.	   If	   the	   body	   proves	   to	   be	   but	   one	   kind	   of	  mediating	  
interface	  itself,	  then	  on	  what	  grounds	  should	  the	  mode	  of	  fleshly	  connection	  be	  privileged	  over	  
interactions	  mediated	  by	  motors,	  buttons,	  and	  video	  screens?	   If	  all	   contact	  must	  be	  mediated	  
somehow,	  does	  it	  even	  make	  sense	  to	  consider	  one	  type	  of	  interface	  as	  “more	  authentic”	  than	  
another?	  Is	   it	  right	  to	  equate	  nakedness	  with	  freedom	  from	  technology?	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  use	  an	  
ecocritical	  perspective	  to	  explore	  such	  questions	   in	  the	  text,	   focusing	   in	  particular	  on	  Forster’s	  
depiction	  of	  technology	  as	  devastating	  to	  both	  the	  human	  body	  and	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  space	  
and	  place.	  The	  timeliness	  of	  such	  concerns	  suggests	  that	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	  might	  prove	  even	  
more	   significant	   in	   the	   hypermediated	   world	   of	   today	   than	   it	   was	   a	   hundred	   years	   ago	   for	  
questioning	  the	  relationship	  between	  corporeality,	  representation,	  and	  nature.	  	  
Where	  the	  Human	  Stops:	  Forster’s	  Mechanically-­‐Interfaced	  Body	  
Forster	  begins	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	  by	  inviting	  the	  reader	  to	  envision	  a	  future	  world	  consisting	  
entirely	  of	  mediation	  and	  man-­‐made	  enclosure:	  	  
Imagine,	  if	  you	  can,	  a	  small	  room,	  hexagonal	  in	  shape	  like	  the	  cell	  of	  a	  bee.	  It	  is	  
lighted	  neither	  by	  window	  nor	  by	  lamp,	  yet	  it	  is	  filled	  with	  a	  soft	  radiance.	  There	  
are	   no	   apertures	   for	   ventilation,	   yet	   the	   air	   is	   fresh.	   There	   are	   no	   musical	  
instruments,	   and	   yet,	   at	   the	  moment	   that	  my	  meditation	   opens,	   this	   room	   is	  
throbbing	  with	  melodious	   sounds.	   An	   arm-­‐chair	   is	   in	   the	   centre,	   by	   its	   side	   a	  
reading	  desk—that	  is	  all	  the	  furniture.	  (91)	  
Seated	  in	  the	  mechanized	  arm-­‐chair	   is	  Vashti,	  a	  diminutive	  woman	  who	  dwells	   in	  this	  hive-­‐like	  
enclosure	  physically	  isolated	  and	  surrounded	  by	  levers,	  buttons,	  and	  tubes.	  Vashti	  interacts	  with	  
her	   world	   entirely	   by	   way	   of	   mechanized	   mediation:	   her	   automated	   chair	   rolls	   obediently	  
however	  she	  directs	   it	   (on	  the	  rare	  occasions	  she	  has	  to	  move	  through	  physical	  space,	   that	   is)	  
and	  her	  relations	  with	  other	  people	  are	  mediated	  wholly	  by	  visual	  images	  and	  electrical	  sounds.	  
The	  narrator’s	  description	  of	  Vashti’s	  body,	  seated	  in	  her	  arm-­‐chair	  and	  reading	  by	  artificial	  light,	  
suggests	  that	  such	  extreme	  mediation,	  however,	  extends	  her	  sense	  of	  self	  only	  at	  an	  exorbitant	  
cost	  to	  her	  body:	  she	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “swaddled	  lump	  of	  flesh”	  (90).	  Forster’s	  narrator	  marks	  
this	  othered	  body	  with	  a	  nod	  to	  Jonathan	  Swift’s	  satiric	   literalization	  of	  the	  figurative:	  Vashti’s	  
immature	   and	   undeveloped	   body	   is	   not	   merely	   clothed	   but	   in	   fact	   “swaddled”	   just	   like	   an	  
infant’s	   would	   be.	   As	   a	   mere	   “lump”	   her	   body	   suggests	   an	   uninhabited	   mass	   of	   vegetative	  
material	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  muscularly	  integrated	  corporeality,	  and	  through	  a	  lifetime	  of	  dwelling	  
in	  a	  subterranean	  realm	  unlit	  by	  the	  sun,	  Vashti’s	  white	  countenance	  has	  become	  like	  other	  pale	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things	   under	   the	   earth,	   “like	   a	   fungus”	   (91),	   a	   term	   that	   suggests	   not	   only	   pallor	   but	   also	  
vegetative	   inertness	   and,	   importantly,	   decay.	   (The	   suggestive	   connection	   between	   Vashti’s	  
feeble	   body	   and	   Decadence	   with	   a	   capital	   “D”—like	   H.G.	   Wells’	   effete	   Eloi	   in	   The	   Time	  
Machine—	  is	  no	  accident,	  as	  we	  shall	  see.)	  	  
In	   the	   same	   way	   that	   Forster	   parodically	   literalizes	   the	   figurative	   here,	   he	   also	   exposes	   the	  
figurative	   nature	   of	   what	   modern	   society	   unreflectively	   calls	   “being	   in	   touch.”5	   Vashti	   un-­‐
ironically	   considers	  herself	   in	   close	   contact	  with	   “several	   thousand	  people”—even	   though	  her	  
physical	  isolation	  means	  that	  she	  has	  never	  seen	  a	  single	  one	  of	  them	  in	  the	  flesh,	  and	  doesn’t	  
want	  to.	  For	  her,	  the	  visual	  and	  auditory	  images	  provided	  by	  the	  Machine—a	  striking	  analogue	  
for	  “being	  connected”	  in	  contemporary	  cyberculture—not	  only	  make	  physical	  interaction	  passé,	  
but	   also	   stigmatize	   and	   make	   obsolete	   first-­‐hand	   sensation	   generally.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
advanced	  lecturers	  had	  admonished	  remotely	  through	  the	  video-­‐screen,	  
“Beware	  of	  first-­‐hand	  ideas!	  […]	  First-­‐hand	  ideas	  do	  not	  really	  exist	  […]	  Let	  your	  
ideas	   be	   second-­‐hand,	   and	   if	   possible,	   tenth-­‐hand,	   for	   then	   they	   will	   be	   far-­‐
removed	   from	   that	   disturbing	   element—direct	   observation.	   Do	   not	   learn	  
anything	  about	  this	  subject	  of	  mine—the	  French	  Revolution.	  Learn	  instead	  what	  
I	  think	  that	  Enicharmon	  thought	  Urizen	  thought	  Gutch	  thought	  Ho-­‐Yung	  thought	  
Chi-­‐Bo-­‐Sing	   thought	   Lafcadio	   Hearn	   thought	   Carlyle	   thought	   Mirabeau	   said	  
about	  the	  French	  Revolution.”	  (114)	  
In	  stringing	  out	  this	  lengthy	  chain	  of	  mediated	  mediations	  Forster’s	  narrator	  lands	  a	  satiric	  jab	  at	  
the	  mediations	  performed	  by	  the	  academy	  as	  well,	  while	  also	  (it	  would	  seem)	  anticipating	  the	  
bracketing	   of	   the	   referent	   in	   structuralism	   and	   the	   endless	   deferral	   of	   signification	   in	  
poststructural	   theory.	   Representing	   mediation	   in	   such	   a	   hyperbolically	   parodic	   vein	   strongly	  
suggests	  that,	  for	  the	  narrator,	  something	  does	  in	  fact	  qualify	  as	  “direct	  observation”	  in	  contrast	  
to	  these	  mediated	  modes	  of	  access,	  namely	  (as	  we	  find	  out	  later	  in	  the	  story),	  the	  immediacy	  of	  
fleshly	  contact.	  
Early	  in	  the	  story,	  Vashti’s	  armchair-­‐bound,	  nth-­‐hand	  philosophizing	  finds	  itself	  interrupted	  by	  a	  
Machine-­‐mediated	  video	  call	   from	  her	  physically	  remote	  son	  Kuno	  (see	  the	  passage	  quoted	  at	  
the	   beginning	   of	   this	   paper).	   For	   Kuno,	   telepresence	   simply	   isn’t	   “present	   enough”;	  machine-­‐
mediated	   images	  offer	  only	  an	   inauthentic	  simulation	  of	  an	  original,	  making	  a	  person	   lose	  too	  
much	   in	   translation.	   Kuno	   is,	   like	   Tennyson’s	   mirror-­‐gazing	   Lady	   of	   Shalott	   or	   Oscar	   Wilde’s	  
disillusioned	   Sibyl	   in	   The	   Picture	   of	   Dorian	   Gray,	   “sick	   of	   shadows”—and	   yearns	   instead	   to	  
experience	  contact	  with	  the	  real	  without	  an	  image	  as	  a	  go-­‐between.	  For	  him,	  Forster’s	  desire	  to	  
“only	  connect”	  must	  be	  attained	  directly	  through	  his	  own	  body,	  for	  without	  corporeal	  contact,	  
the	  “imponderable	  bloom”	  of	  physical	  presence	  is	  lost.	  As	  the	  narrator	  explains,	  
The	  imponderable	  bloom,	  declared	  by	  a	  discredited	  philosophy	  to	  be	  the	  actual	  
essence	   of	   intercourse,	   was	   […]	   ignored	   by	   the	   Machine,	   just	   as	   the	  
imponderable	  bloom	  of	  the	  grape	  was	  ignored	  by	  the	  manufacturers	  of	  artificial	  
fruit.	  Something	  “good	  enough”	  had	  long	  since	  been	  accepted	  by	  our	  race.	  (93)	  
Kuno	  nonetheless	  persuades	  Vashti	  to	  travel	  by	  airship	  and	  come	  see	  him	  half	  a	  world	  away.	  The	  
voyage	   is	   traumatizing	   for	   her	   first	   because	   it	   requires	   that	   she	   physically	   “locomote”	   and	  
actually	  walk	   from	  the	  elevator	   to	  her	  cabin	  on	  the	  ship,	  and	  second	  because	  she	   is	   forced	  to	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abandon	  her	  subterranean	  hive-­‐womb	  and	  face	  the	  first-­‐hand	  reality	  of	  the	  earth’s	  surface.	  (The	  
extremity	  of	  her	  agoraphobic	  horror	  had	  been	  made	  all	  the	  more	  apparent	  when	  she	  first	  gazed	  
down	   the	   tunnel	   leading	   away	   from	   her	   room.	   Though	   still	   underground,	   she	   is	   nonetheless	  
“seized	  with	  the	  terrors	  of	  direct	  experience”	  and	  retreats	  to	  the	  womb-­‐like	  security	  of	  her	  cell	  
and	  all	   its	  umbilically-­‐mediated	  connections	  to	  the	  outer	  world	  [97]).	  For	  Vashti,	  the	  surface	  of	  
the	  earth	  is	  a	  harsh,	  dead	  world.	  The	  citizens	  of	  her	  Machine-­‐society	  are	  permitted	  to	  travel	  to	  
its	  brown	  post-­‐apocalyptic	  surface	  only	  with	  special	  permits	  and	  artificial	  respirators,	  and	  do	  so	  
only	   to	   obtain	   raw	   material	   that	   can	   then	   be	   mediated	   into	   suitable	   lecture	   topics.	   (The	  
presence	  of	  renegade	  humans	  on	  the	  surface,	  which	  Kuno	  later	  recounts	  in	  his	  escape	  narrative,	  
suggests	  that	  rather	  than	  the	  surface	  lacking	  adequate	  oxygen,	  machine-­‐dependent	  lungs	  have	  
simply	  lost	  their	  capacity	  to	  breathe	  mechanically-­‐unprocessed	  air.)	  As	  the	  ship	  glides	  over	  Asia,	  
Vashti’s	  dread	  of	  first-­‐hand	  bodily	  sensation	  succeeds	  in	  draining	  color	  even	  from	  the	  sublime.	  
When	  the	  window	  of	  her	  ship’s	  cabin	  reveals	  a	  rosy-­‐fingered	  sunrise	  and	  the	  majestic	  verticality	  
of	  the	  Himalayas,	  Vashti	  is	  indignant,	  and	  blots	  them	  out	  with	  a	  response	  of	  “No	  ideas	  here”—
and	   promptly	   shuts	   her	   blinds	   (103).6	   Vashti’s	   failure	   to	   be	   “in	   touch”	   (literally)	   is	   further	  
revealed	   in	   the	   shock	   she	   feels	   when	   a	   flight	   attendant	   dares	  make	   physical	   contact	   to	   help	  
Vashti	   gain	   her	   feet	   when	   she	   nearly	   falls.	   “How	   dare	   you!”	   Vashti	   exclaims.	   “You	   forget	  
yourself!”	  The	  narrator	  explains,	  “People	  never	  touched	  one	  another.	  The	  custom	  had	  become	  
obsolete,	   owing	   to	   the	  Machine”	   (101).	   In	   these	   ways	   Forster	   again	   recalls	   Swiftian	   satire	   in	  
representing	  Vashti	  as	  pure	  mentality	  dissociated	  from	  direct	  physical	  experience,	  recalling	  the	  
discarnate	  rationalism	  of	  Laputa	  in	  Gulliver’s	  Travels.	  
Vashti’s	  machine-­‐mediated	  “othering”	  of	  the	  body	  can	  be	  understood	  broadly	  as	  a	  valorization	  
of	  reflective	  reason	  that	  turns	  primary	  bodily	  sensation	  into	  an	  Other—or,	  more	  specifically,	  as	  a	  
method	   that	   privileges	   rationally	   organized	   sensation	  over	  more	   visceral	  modes	  of	   awareness	  
such	   as	   olfaction,	   tactile	   sensation,	   or	   even	   imagination.	   In	   particular,	   Vashti’s	   cell	   (which	   is	  
endlessly	  replicated	  without	  variation	  throughout	  the	  entire	  underground	  hive	  of	  the	  Machine)	  
represents	  a	  condition	   in	  which	  knowledge	   is	  obtainable	  only	  through	  technological	  mediation	  
and	   self-­‐enclosure.	   Historically,	   this	   depiction	   recalls	   both	   the	   shape	   and	   the	   function	   of	   the	  
camera	   obscura,	   a	   device	   which	   acted	   not	   only	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   photography	   but	   also	   as	   a	  
quintessentially	  Cartesian	  interface	  between	  body	  and	  world.	  In	  Techniques	  of	  the	  Observer:	  On	  
Vision	  and	  Modernity	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century—an	  important	  revisionist	  reading	  of	  the	  camera	  
obscura	  device—Jonathan	  Crary	  emphasizes	   its	  Cartesian,	  quantitative	  aspects	  and	  shows	  how	  
two	  paintings	  by	  Vermeer,	  The	  Geographer	  and	  The	  Astronomer,	  each	  represent	  this	  rationally	  
mediated	  view	  of	  the	  world	  (see	  Figure	  1,	  below).	  	  
Crary’s	   descriptions	   strikingly	   recall	   the	   narrator’s	   account	   of	   Vashti’s	   cell	   in	   “The	   Machine	  
Stops”:	  	  
Each	   image	   depicts	   a	   solitary	  male	   figure	   absorbed	   in	   learned	   pursuits	  within	  
the	  rectangular	  confines	  of	  a	  shadowy	  interior,	  an	  interior	  punctured	  apparently	  
by	  only	  a	  single	  window.	  The	  astronomer	  studies	  a	  celestial	  globe,	  mapped	  out	  
with	  the	  constellations;	  the	  geographer	  has	  before	  him	  a	  nautical	  map.	  Each	  has	  
his	   eyes	   averted	   from	   the	   aperture	   that	   opens	   onto	   the	   outside.	   The	   exterior	  
world	  is	  known	  not	  by	  direct	  sensory	  examination	  but	  through	  a	  mental	  survey	  
of	  its	  “clear	  and	  distinct”	  representation	  within	  the	  room.	  (46)	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Figure	  1.	  Vermeer’s	  paintings	  The	  Geographer	  and	  The	  Astronomer.	  
	  
Crary	   concludes	   that	  under	   this	  Cartesian	  paradigm,	   the	  Geographer	   and	  Astronomer	  actually	  
require	  such	  isolation	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  any	  knowledge	  whatsoever.	  The	  world	  of	  qualitative	  
sensation	  must	  first	  be	  abjected	  as	  a	  contaminant.	  Quantifiable	  sensations	  are	  then	  distilled	  and	  
turned	   into	   “ideas”	   that	   attain	   value	   only	   because	   they	   have	   been	   culturally	   produced.	   For	  
Vashti,	  the	  attempt	  to	  derive	  knowledge	  from	  direct	  perception	  would	  thus	  simply	  be	  gauche—
before	   sensations	   can	   be	   registered	   as	   “ideas”	   they	  must	   first	   bounce	   off	   of	   the	   interpretive	  
mirror	  of	  society.	   In	  addition	  to	  abjecting	   input	  from	  the	  seemingly	  “less	  rational”	  senses	  than	  
sight,	   this	   reduction	   of	   the	   world	   to	   technological	   mediation	   and	   quantification	   also	   rejects	  
imagination	   in	   favor	   of	   empirical	   data.	   As	   Paul	   March-­‐Russell	   argues	   in	   a	   recent	   essay,	   “the	  
citizens	  of	   ‘The	  Machine	  Stops’	  have	  exchanged	   imagination	  for	   ideas”	  and	  such	   ideas	  “do	  not	  
comment	   on	   the	  mind’s	   capacity	   for	   imaging	   the	  world	   but	  mirror	   the	  world	   as	   an	   objective	  
given”	   (64).	   The	   criterion	   of	   objectively	   faithful	   “mirroring”	   is	   crucial	   to	   an	   epistemology	   of	  
rationalized	   isolation	   that	  quarantines	   the	  sensing	  subject	   from	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge.7	  The	  
narrator’s	   very	   introduction	   to	   the	   story,	   “Imagine,	   if	   you	   can”	   (91),	   thus	   already	   betrays	   a	  
machine-­‐subverting	  agenda	  on	  the	  level	  of	  form	  by	  demanding	  that	  the	  reader	  behave	  in	  ways	  
counter	   to	  Vashti,	   i.e.,	   that	  he	  or	   she	   should	   instead	  participate	   imaginatively	   in	  picturing	   the	  
account	  that	  follows.	  	  
To	  Vashti’s	   horror,	  when	   she	  arrives	   and	   sees	  Kuno	   in	  person	   she	  discovers	   that	  he	  has	  been	  
experimenting	  with	   an	   epistemology	   far	   removed	   from	   that	   propounded	   by	   the	  Machine.	   By	  
secretly	  exercising	  his	  body	  and	  discovering	  a	  passage	   to	   the	  hazardous	  surface	  outside,	  Kuno	  
has	   embraced	   a	   new	   and	   forbidden	  mode	   of	   awareness,	   namely,	   fleshly	   participation.	   (Kuno	  
began	   his	   radical	   exercise	   regimen	   by	   using	   his	   pillow	   as	   weightlifting	   equipment,	   which	  
demonstrates	  just	  how	  enfeebled	  his	  mechanically-­‐mediated	  body	  had	  originally	  been!)	  Vashti	  is	  
astonished	  equally	  by	  Kuno’s	  heresy	  and	  by	  what	  he	  has	  achieved	  through	  muscle-­‐power	  alone.	  
Kuno	  has	  in	  fact	  reclaimed	  his	  body	  by	  exploring	  the	  connective	  possibilities	  of	  sinews	  instead	  of	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mechanism	   or	   mentality.	   Even	   by	   the	   early	   20th	   century	   it	   had	   become	   a	   truism	   that	  
communication	   technology	   and	  mechanized	   travel	   both	   abolish	   physical	   distance.	   In	   Forster’s	  
indeterminately	   deep	   future	   where	   food,	   entertainment	   and	   information	   all	   get	   conveyed	   to	  
people	   instead	   the	   other	  way	   around,	   Kuno’s	   concern	   is	   that	   along	  with	   such	   an	   abolition	   of	  
physical	   space	   has	   come	   an	   abolition	   of	   humanity	   itself.	   Because	   humankind	   has	   severed	   its	  
connection	  with	  un-­‐mechanized	  reality,	  both	  nature	  and	  the	  body	  have	  been	  lost,	  and	  both	  may	  
only	  be	  reclaimed	  through	  direct	  sensory	  engagement,	  as	  Kuno	  relates	  here	  to	  his	  mother:	  
“You	  know	  that	  we	  have	  lost	  the	  sense	  of	  space.	  We	  say	  ‘space	  is	  annihilated’,	  
but	  we	  have	  annihilated	  not	  space	  but	  the	  sense	  thereof.	  We	  have	  lost	  a	  part	  of	  
ourselves.	   I	  determined	  to	  recover	  it,	  and	  I	  began	  by	  walking	  up	  and	  down	  the	  
platform	  of	  the	  railway	  outside	  my	  room.	  Up	  and	  down,	  until	  I	  was	  tired,	  and	  so	  
did	  recapture	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘near’	  and	  ‘far’.	  ‘Near’	  is	  a	  place	  to	  which	  I	  can	  get	  
quickly	  on	  my	  feet,	  not	  a	  place	  to	  which	  the	  train	  or	  air-­‐ship	  will	  take	  me	  quickly.	  
‘Far’	   is	   a	  place	   to	  which	   I	   cannot	   get	  quickly	  on	  my	   feet;	   the	   vomitory	   is	   ‘far’,	  
though	  I	  could	  be	  there	  in	  thirty-­‐eight	  seconds	  by	  summoning	  the	  train.	  Man	  is	  
the	  measure.	  That	  was	  my	  first	  lesson.	  Man’s	  feet	  are	  the	  measure	  for	  distance,	  
his	  hands	  are	  the	  measure	  for	  ownership,	  his	  body	  is	  the	  measure	  for	  all	  that	  is	  
lovable	  and	  desirable	  and	  strong.”	  (105)	  
Here	   Kuno	   takes	   Protagoras’	   famous	   dictum	   and	   literalizes	   it	   with	   his	   body:	   i.e.,	   he	   says	   to	  
himself	   “Man	   is	   the	  measure,”	  by	  which	  he	  means	   that	  his	  own	   fleshly	  body	  has	  become	   the	  
new	  canon	  for	  measuring	  the	  world	  (note	  how	  he	  gauges	  physical	  space	  in	  “feet”).	   In	  this	  way	  
the	   repressed	   body	   not	   only	   returns	   to	   claim	   physical	   space,	   but	   also	   displaces	   mechanical	  
standards	  of	  measurement.8	  Furthermore,	  Kuno’s	  corporeal	  recapturing	  of	  the	  “near”	  and	  “far”	  
subdues	   the	  cartographic	   impulse	   that	  we	  see	   in	   the	  enlightenment-­‐era	  paintings	  of	  Vermeer.	  
Instead	  of	  mapping	  space	  abstractly	  through	  the	  media	  of	  compasses,	  globes,	  and	  maps,	  Kuno	  
experiences	   it	   first-­‐hand	   (or	   better	   yet,	   “first-­‐foot”)	   through	   concrete	   sensation	   and	   self-­‐
initiated	  muscular	  exertion.9	  The	  upshot	  of	  Kuno’s	  project,	  understood	  phenomenologically,	   is	  
that	  one’s	  experience	  of	  both	  the	  world	  and	  the	  body	  becomes	  radically	  altered	  depending	  on	  
whether	  the	  terrain	  is	  encountered	  by	  way	  of	  one’s	  own	  coordinated	  limbs	  or	  via	  a	  coordinate-­‐
laden	  visual	  representation.10	  
Kuno’s	   victorious	   escape	   to	   the	   surface—in	  which	   he	   emerges,	   bloodied,	   to	   see	   his	   first	  wild	  
landscape	  and	  glimpses	  a	   renegade	  woman	  dwelling	   in	   the	   lands	  above—echoes	  and	   in	   some	  
measure	   inverts	   Plato’s	   story	   of	   the	   Cave.	   Unlike	   Plato’s	   prisoner,	   Kuno	   had	   not	   been	   held	  
captive	   by	   his	   senses	   but	   rather	   by	   his	   own	   overdeveloped	   critical	   faculties.	   But	   like	   Plato’s	  
escapee,	  Kuno	  returns	  underground	  both	  bedazzled	  by	  the	   light	  and	  zealous	  to	  overthrow	  the	  
existing	   system,	   which	   make	   him	   a	   danger	   to	   the	   established	   mechanical	   order.	   For	   his	  
disobedience,	  Kuno	  is	  threatened	  with	  “Homelessness”—a	  penalty	  in	  which	  outcasts	  are	  left	  to	  
die	  from	  exposure	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  earth	  without	  a	  respirator	  (during	  his	  escape,	  Kuno	  had	  
only	  been	  able	  to	  breathe	  by	  inhaling	  sips	  of	  Machine-­‐produced	  oxygen	  from	  the	  open	  escape	  
hatch).	   Kuno	   escapes	   this	   penalty	   and	   is	   instead	   reassigned	   to	   a	   new	   enclosure	   close	   to	   his	  
mother.	  But	  Kuno’s	  embodied	  actions	  have	   left	   their	  mark	  on	   the	   system:	   in	  order	   to	  combat	  
other	  body-­‐embracing	   insurgents	   like	  Kuno,	  the	  Machine	  bans	  all	  respirators	  and	  reestablishes	  
religious	  worship	  (i.e.,	  a	  fundamentalist	  devotion	  to	  the	  Machine).	  But	  Kuno	  insists	  not	  only	  that	  
others	   feel	   as	   he	   does,	   but	   also	   that	   people	   dwell	   on	   the	   surface	   already,	   free	   from	   the	  
apparatus	  of	  the	  Machine.	  Soon	  Vashti	  receives	  an	  audio-­‐only	  call	  from	  him	  in	  which	  out	  of	  the	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blackness	  Kuno	  simply	  says	  “The	  Machine	  stops”	  (117).	  And	  before	  long,	  it	  does.	  The	  Machine’s	  
music	   starts	   to	   play	   incorrectly,	   the	   climate-­‐controlled	   air	   begins	   to	   smell	   foul,	   and	   control	  
buttons	   stop	  working.	  Ultimately	   the	  Machine	   shuts	  down	  and	   its	  hum	  vanishes,	   and	  most	  of	  
the	  population	  dies	   from	  the	  shock	  of	  such	  silence	  and	  perceived	  disconnection;	  they	  have	  no	  
other	  way	  to	  eat,	  interact,	  or	  even	  sleep	  without	  the	  Machine.	  As	  the	  airships	  crash	  and	  explode	  
above	   them,	   Kuno	   kisses	   Vashti—at	   last	  making	   physical	   contact	  with	   his	  mother.	  Ultimately,	  
their	   underground	   enclosure	   ruptures	   like	   a	   honeycomb	   and	   “for	   a	   moment	   they	   saw	   the	  
nations	   of	   the	   dead,	   and,	   before	   they	   joined	   them,	   scraps	   of	   the	   untainted	   sky”	   (123).	   Such	  
radical	  un-­‐enclosure,	  for	  all	  its	  sublimity,	  proves	  as	  lethal	  to	  their	  frail	  bodies	  as	  a	  killing	  jar.	  
Where	  the	  Machine	  Stops:	  Forster’s	  Nostalgia	  for	  “Beautiful	  Naked	  Man”	  
	  Although	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	  concludes	  with	  the	  spectacular	  death	  of	   its	  primary	  characters	  
Kuno	  and	  Vashti,	  the	  narrator	  seems	  much	  more	  interested	  in	  presenting	  a	  generalized	  homily	  
on	   the	  doom	  of	  Machine-­‐mediated	  humanity	  as	   a	  whole,	   framing	   the	  horrifying	   conclusion	   in	  
archetypal	  terms:	  
[…]	   beautiful	   naked	   man	   was	   dying,	   strangled	   in	   the	   garments	   that	   he	   had	  
woven.	  Century	  after	  century	  had	  he	  toiled,	  and	  here	  was	  his	  reward.	  Truly	  the	  
garment	   had	   seemed	  heavenly	   at	   first,	   shot	  with	   the	   colours	   of	   culture,	   sewn	  
with	   the	   threads	   of	   self-­‐denial.	   And	   heavenly	   it	   had	   been	   so	   long	   as	   it	   was	   a	  
garment	   and	   no	   more,	   so	   long	   as	   man	   could	   shed	   it	   at	   will	   and	   live	   by	   the	  
essence	  that	  is	  his	  soul,	  and	  the	  essence,	  equally	  divine,	  that	  is	  his	  body.	  (122)	  
The	  narrator’s	  plea	  here	  on	  behalf	  of	  “beautiful	  naked	  man”	  demands	  close	  attention,	  especially	  
because	  of	  its	  dependence	  on	  the	  governing	  metaphor	  of	  the	  “strangling	  garment”	  as	  the	  source	  
of	   humanity’s	   downfall.	   If	   cultural	   and	   technological	   mediations	   are	   indeed	   a	   garment,	   then	  
Forster’s	  idealized	  vision	  conceives	  such	  garments	  as	  something	  that	  we	  ought	  ideally	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  put	  on	  and	  take	  off	  at	  will,	  like	  a	  sweater.	  Such	  provocative	  imagery	  involving	  clothing	  (or	  lack	  
thereof)	  is	  crucial	  not	  only	  here	  but	  throughout	  Forster’s	  text.	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier,	  Vashti	  had	  not	  
been	  merely	   clothed,	  but	   “swaddled.”	  The	  act	  of	   swaddling	  not	  only	  wraps	  but	   restrains	   (and	  
pacifies),	   suggesting	  Vashti’s	   passive	   entanglement	   in	   the	   vestments	   of	   culture,	   and	   thus	   that	  
she	   was	   constrained	   to	   a	   limbless,	   enfeebling	   state	   of	   infancy	   before	   the	  Machine.	  Whereas	  
swaddling	  protects	  a	  baby	  by	  restricting	  the	  movement	  of	  flailing	  body	  parts,	  for	  a	  mature	  adult	  
such	   restriction	   on	   physical	   action	   constitutes	   a	   straitjacket.	   The	  Machine	   has	   attained	   what	  
Gorman	   Beauchamp	   calls	   “sovereignty	   through	   dependency”	   (57).	   It	   is	   thus	   important	   that	  
Kuno’s	   first	   gestures	   at	   liberation	   from	   the	   Machine	   specifically	   involve	   the	   unmechanized	  
employment	  of	  his	  own	   limbs:	  he	   treads	   the	   tunnels	  with	  his	  own	   feet	   (instead	  of	   rolling	   in	  a	  
mechanical	  chair),	  and	  climbs	  a	  ladder	  with	  his	  bare	  hands	  (instead	  of	  pressing	  a	  button	  for	  an	  
elevator).	  Kuno	  exercised—as	  he	  put	  it—until	  his	  “flesh	  ached”	  (106).	  Significantly,	  in	  addition	  to	  
his	   use	   of	   physical	   limbs	   and	   musculature,	   Kuno	   marks	   his	   desire	   to	   strip	   away	   the	   cultural	  
apparatus	  with	  precisely	  the	  same	  imagery	  used	  in	  the	  narrator’s	  homily,	   i.e.,	   in	  terms	  of	  shed	  
clothing:	  	  
I	   felt	   that	   humanity	   existed,	   and	   that	   it	   existed	   without	   clothes.	   How	   can	   I	  
possibly	  explain	  this?	  It	  was	  naked,	  humanity	  seemed	  naked,	  and	  all	  these	  tubes	  
and	  buttons	  and	  machineries	  neither	  came	  into	  the	  world	  with	  us,	  nor	  will	  they	  
follow	   us	   out,	   nor	   do	   they	   matter	   supremely	   while	   we	   are	   here.	   Had	   I	   been	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strong,	   I	  would	  have	  torn	  off	  every	  garment	   I	  had,	  and	  gone	   into	  the	  outer	  air	  
unswaddled.	   But	   this	   is	   not	   for	  me,	   nor	   perhaps	   for	  my	   generation.	   I	   climbed	  
with	  my	  respirator	  and	  my	  hygienic	  clothes	  and	  my	  dietetic	  tabloids!	  Better	  thus	  
than	  not	  at	  all.	  (107)	  
For	  Forster,	  dystopia	  thus	  ensues	  when	  technology	  and	  culture	  swaddle	  rather	  than	  adorn—or	  
to	  mix	  my	  metaphors,	  when	  culture	  becomes	  an	  iron	  lung	  that	  performs	  the	  job	  of	  breathing	  for	  
us	  rather	  than	  acting	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  our	  own	  lung	  capacity	  (as	  seems	  literally	  to	  be	  the	  case	  
in	   the	   narrative).	   The	   fact	   that	   capital	   punishment	   in	   Machine-­‐society	   is	   achieved	   through	  
“Homelessness”	  (i.e.,	  death	  by	  exposure)	  only	  further	  exemplifies	  Forster’s	  attempt	  to	  represent	  
the	  Machine	  as	  just	  such	  an	  iron	  lung.	  The	  priests	  of	  the	  Machine	  are	  able	  justify	  its	  supremacy	  
by	  saying	  something	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  “If	  you	  don’t	  like	  the	  Machine,	  then	  go	  ahead,	  experience	  
life	   on	   the	   surface	   without	   it—and	   suffocate.”	   Because	   death	   inevitably	   results	   from	   the	  
deprivation	  from	  mechanical	  swaddling,	  the	  Machine	  insidiously	  comes	  to	  seem	  that	  much	  more	  
originary	  (indeed,	  motherly)	  and	  self-­‐validatingly	  authoritative.	  	  
The	   validity	   of	   Forster’s	   metaphor	   of	   technological	   mediation	   as	   “strangling	   garment”	   is,	  
however,	   open	   to	   strong	   critique.	   Philosophers	   such	   as	  Martin	   Heidegger,	   Maurice	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty,	   and	   Paul	   Virilio	   would	   of	   course	   challenge	   Forster’s	   basic	   metaphor	   by	   arguing	   that	  
technology’s	  effects	  do	  far	  more	  than	  merely	  clothe	  their	  users.	  Rather,	  technology	  becomes	  a	  
mode	   of	   awareness	   in	   itself,	   something	   so	   pervasive	   that	   it	   infiltrates	   the	   very	   shape	   of	   our	  
world-­‐view	   rather	   than	   just	   accessorizing	   it.	   In	   Gorman	   Beauchamp’s	   reading	   of	   the	   story	   in	  
“Technology	   in	   the	   Dystopian	   Novel,”	   Forster’s	   technotopia	   exemplifies	   the	   Machine	   as	   an	  
autonomous	  force	  which,	  once	  created,	  becomes	  an	  agent	  unto	   itself	  over	  which	  we	  maintain	  
no	   more	   control	   and	   therefore	   ought	   to	   fear	   (what	   Isaac	   Asimov	   termed	   the	   “Frankenstein	  
Complex”).	   In	  this	  reading	  Forster’s	  metaphor	  of	  the	  garment	  seems	  that	  much	  more	   ill-­‐fitting	  
because	   the	  Machine	   employs	   specifically	   “mechanomorphic”	   effects	   on	   its	   subjects—people	  
themselves	  become	  mechanical	  or,	  as	  Thoreau	  once	  put	   it,	  “Tools	  of	   their	   tools”	   (see	  Gorman	  
57-­‐60).11	  	  
The	  metaphor	   of	   the	   technological	   garment	   is	   thus	   all	   the	  more	   awkward	  when	   the	  Machine	  
becomes	  the	  active	  agent,	  ensuring	  that	  we	  fit	  it	  rather	  than	  that	  it	  fit	  us.	  Technology	  moreover	  
so	  permeates	  our	  everyday	  interactions	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  matter	  to	  pinpoint	  each	  particular	  
item	  of	  technological	  “clothing”	  we	  wear	  in	  order	  to	  shed	  it	  on	  demand.	  Some	  technologies	  feel	  
more	  “natural”	  than	  others—and	  over	  time,	  become	  more	  like	  skin	  than	  clothing.12	  As	  computer	  
scientist	  Alan	  Kay	  puts	   it,	  “Technology	   is	  anything	  that	  came	  out	  after	  you	  were	  born”	  (qtd.	   in	  
Kelly	   par.	   1).	   For	   instance,	   although	   for	   most	   adults	   the	   Internet	   still	   feels	   technological,	   we	  
forget	  how	  we	  naturalize	  other	  everyday	  technological	  interfaces	  like	  eyeglasses,	  eating	  utensils,	  
shoes,	  clothing,	  houses,	  and	  extensions	  like	  writing	  that	  feel	  so	  basic	  to	  our	  human	  identity	  that	  
we	  fail	  to	  realize	  they	  are	  even	  technological	  at	  all.13	  	  
Probably	  the	  most	  serious	  problem	  with	  Forster’s	  notion	  of	  “mediation	  as	  garment”	  is	  that	  this	  
image	   presupposes	   that	   there	   exists	   an	   originary,	   technology-­‐free	   body	   underneath	   that	  
garment.	   But	   as	  Donna	  Haraway	   and	  N.	   Katherine	  Hayles	   have	   amply	   demonstrated,	   humans	  
exist	   in	  an	  “always	  already”	  relationship	  with	  the	  technological.	  Human	  bodies	  have	  coevolved	  
with	  technology	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  our	  “given”	  bodily	  state	  at	  birth	  already	  bears	  the	  marks	  
of	  technological	  prosthetics	  physically	  external	  to	  it.	  One	  reason	  why	  we	  humans	  have	  lost	  most	  
of	   our	   hair	   and	   claws	   over	   evolutionary	   time	   is	   that	   we	   have	   made	   prosthetic	   substitutes.	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Clothing	  usurps	   fur,	   and	   tools	   turn	  our	   claws	   into	   cast-­‐off	   vestiges:	  whether	  we	   like	   it	   or	  not,	  
parts	   of	   our	   bodies	   have	   been	   given	   over	   to	   technological	   extensions	   ab	   initio,	   and	   in	  
consequence,	   our	   cultural	   “garment”	   is	   already	   an	  obligatory	   life-­‐support	   system	  whether	  we	  
like	  it	  or	  not.	  Forster’s	  “beautiful	  naked	  man,”	  ironically	  enough,	  thus	  bears	  conspicuous	  marks	  
of	  technology	  precisely	  because	  of	  his	  nakedness,	  not	  in	  spite	  of	  it.	  Such	  pervasive	  technological	  
integration	   through	   evolutionary	   history	   has	   had	   the	   result	   that	   human	   beings	   have	   become	  
what	   cognitive	   scientist	  Andy	  Clark	   calls	   “natural-­‐born	   cyborgs.”	  Vashti	   has	  merely	   ridden	  her	  
mechanical	  armchair	  down	  the	  shiny	  corridor	  of	  technological	  mediation	  farther	  than	  we	  have	  
(as	  yet),	  having	  become	  so	  dependent	  on	  the	  Machine	  to	  do	  her	  work	  that	  she	  ends	  up	  entirely	  
hairless,	   toothless	   and	   her	   body	   an	   unarticulated	   lump.	   The	   articulated	   body	   has	   not	   been	  
destroyed,	   however,	   but	   only	   displaced—it	   now	   resides	   exoskeletally	   in	   the	   external,	  
mechanical	  prosthetics	  Vashti	  uses	  exclusively	   in	  order	   to	  make	   sense	  of	  her	  world	   (as	  we	  do	  
more	  and	  more	  ourselves).14	  For	  these	  reasons,	  Forster’s	  attempt	  to	  find	  recourse	  in	  a	  natural	  or	  
technology-­‐free	   body	   in	   “beautiful	   naked	  man”	   is	   doomed	   to	   fail	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	  
there	  exists	  no	  such	  originary	  body	  to	  seek.15	  
Understanding	  the	  story	  this	  way,	  one	  can	  read	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	  as	  representing	  two	  rival	  
modernist	  fantasies	  for	  escaping	  alienation	  in	  order	  to	  encounter	  pure	  presence.	  For	  Vashti	  and	  
other	  disciples	  of	  the	  Machine,	  the	  fantasy	  is	  to	  escape	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  body	  and	  thereby	  access	  
pure	  meaning	  without	  the	  intervening	  constraints	  of	  sensory	  contact.	  She	  yearns	  to	  escape	  the	  
cave	  of	  the	  senses	  and	  bask	  in	  the	  brilliance	  of	  mental	  illumination	  outside	  the	  corporeal	  shell—
a	   perfect	   exemplar	   of	   what	   N.	   Katherine	   Hayles	   calls	   “the	   condition	   of	   virtuality”	   in	   which	  
information	   “loses	   its	   body,”	   having	   been	   “conceptualized	   as	   an	   entity	   separate	   from	   the	  
material	  forms	  in	  which	  it	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  embedded”	  (2).	  	  
Vashti’s	  fantasy	  of	  bodiless	  contact	  fails,	  however,	  because	  the	  repressed	  corporeal	  body	  keeps	  
coming	   back	   to	   haunt	   her	   as	   the	   hidden	   medium	   through	   which	   all	   information	   must	   be	  
instantiated.	  	  
But	   the	   antidote,	   Kuno’s	   rediscovery	   of	   the	   corporeal	   body,	   also	   fails	   as	   a	   transparent	   or	  
immediate	  experience	  of	  the	  world.	  Without	  there	  being	  a	  concrete	  point	  of	  contact—whether	  
it	   be	   through	   tactile	   sensation,	   vision,	   taste,	   smell,	   etc.—no	   contact	   can	   happen	   at	   all.	   Flesh	  
therefore	   performs	   peculiar	  mediations	   of	   awareness	   of	   its	   own.	   Kuno’s	   vision	   is	   thus	   also	   a	  
fantasy—a	   dream	   of	   escaping	   the	   logic	   of	   supplementarity	   in	   order	   to	   touch	   pure	   presence	  
through	   fleshly	   immediacy.	   In	   fact,	   what	   Kuno	   takes	   for	   the	   “imponderable	   bloom”	   of	  
unmediated	  contact	   turns	  out	   to	  be,	   ironically,	  a	   species	  of	  privileged	  remediation,	  a	   term	  Jay	  
Bolter	  and	  Richard	  Grusin	  use	  for	  the	  reconfiguring	  of	  one	  medium	  in	  terms	  of	  another.	  In	  this	  
case,	  Kuno’s	  supposed	  experience	  of	  unmediated	  contact	  comes	  from	  his	  naturalizing	  the	  fleshly	  
interface	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   it	   appears	   to	   be	   no	   interface	   at	   all—and	   questions	   about	   its	  
mediating	   role	   get	   even	  more	   complicated	   when	   you	   read	   Kuno’s	   description	   of	   his	   physical	  
encounter	   with	   earth’s	   surface.	   His	   account	   of	   the	   “imponderable	   bloom”	   of	   fleshly	   contact	  
reveals	  that	  some	  significant	  “pondering”	  is	  in	  fact	  going	  on	  in	  the	  physical	  encounter,	  especially	  
in	  how	  he	  verbally	   invokes	  more-­‐than-­‐physical	   supplements	   to	  make	  physical	   experience	   fully	  
present	   to	   himself.	   In	   a	   passage	  which	   recalls	   Plato’s	   argument	   for	   the	   immediacy	   of	   speech	  
over	   writing	   in	   the	   Phaedrus	   (and	   which	   proves	   vulnerable	   to	   precisely	   the	   same	   type	   of	  
deconstructive	  critique),	  Kuno	  narrates	  to	  his	  mother	  his	   full-­‐bodied	  experience	  on	  the	  earth’s	  
surface.	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You,	   who	   have	   just	   crossed	   the	   Roof	   of	   the	  World,	   will	   not	   want	   to	   hear	   an	  
account	  of	   the	   little	  hills	   that	   I	   saw—low	  colourless	  hills.	  But	   to	  me	  they	  were	  
living	   and	   the	   turf	   that	   covered	   them	   was	   a	   skin,	   under	   which	   their	   muscles	  
rippled,	  and	  I	  felt	  that	  those	  hills	  had	  called	  with	  incalculable	  force	  to	  men	  in	  the	  
past,	   and	   that	  men	   had	   loved	   them.	  Now	   they	   sleep—perhaps	   for	   ever.	   They	  
commune	  with	   humanity	   in	   dreams.	   Happy	   the	  man,	   happy	   the	  woman,	  who	  
awakes	  the	  hills	  of	  Wessex.	  For	  though	  they	  sleep,	  they	  will	  never	  die.	  (110)	  
Note	  how	  Kuno’s	  ostensibly	  unmediated	  experience	  has	  been	  filtered	  largely	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  
an	   idealized	  history	  of	  England,	  and	  how	  a	  poetic	  outpouring	  ensues.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  his	  
pre-­‐existing	  ideas	  about	  the	  surface	  (derived,	  he	  admits,	  from	  lectures),	  Kuno	  emerges	  from	  the	  
mechanized	   underworld	   not	   into	   a	   realm	   of	   uninterpreted	   color-­‐patches	   and	   gross	   haptic	  
sensations,	  but	  rather	  into	  a	  sleepy	  pastoral	  enclosure	  made	  of	  sinews	  and	  skin,	  a	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  
history-­‐infused,	   romance-­‐supplemented	   dreamscape.	   He	   concludes,	   “I	   have	   seen	   the	   hills	   of	  
Wessex	  as	  Aelfrid	  saw	  them	  when	  he	  overthrew	  the	  Danes”	  (110).16	  	  
In	  his	  exuberance	  for	  the	  body,	  Kuno	  seems	  not	  to	  recognize	  just	  how	  figurative	  his	  own	  bodily	  
sensations	  have	  become.	  And	  his	  fleshly	  mode	  of	  awareness	  does	  more	  than	  just	  mythologize;	  it	  
also	   anthropomorphizes.	   In	   order	   to	   register	   for	   Kuno’s	   hyper-­‐embodied	   attunement,	   the	  
landscape	  outside	  must	  in	  turn	  become	  a	  living	  body	  itself:	  turf	  covers	  the	  earth	  (in	  his	  words)	  
“like	   a	   skin”	   and	   under	   it	   “muscles	   rippled”	   (110).17	   In	   short,	   Kuno’s	   supposedly	   “raw”	  
experience	  actually	   comes	  pre-­‐cooked.	  His	  passion	   for	   the	  concrete	  and	   first-­‐hand	  echoes	   the	  
imagists’	  credo	  “No	  ideas	  but	  in	  things,”	  but	  these	  “things”	  still	  inevitably	  enter	  one’s	  awareness	  
with	   ideas	   built-­‐in.	   To	   update	   Kant	   with	   contemporary	   metaphors,	   one	   might	   say	   that	   Kuno	  
unconsciously	  wears	   a	   heads-­‐up	   display	   that	   overlays	   interpretive	   information	   that	   structures	  
even	  his	  most	  visceral	  sensations.18	  Or,	  more	  charitably,	  one	  might	  read	  this	  passage	  as	  Kuno’s	  
attempt	  (paradigmatic	  in	  a	  modernist	  text)	  to	  reenchant	  a	  wasteland	  through	  not	  only	  the	  body,	  
but	   imagination.	   Kuno’s	   verbose	   and	   artful	   textualization	   of	   landscape	   into	   a	   living	   body	   of	  
muscles	   and	   skin	   should	   perhaps	   be	  no	  wonder,	   then,	   considering	   the	   times	   in	  which	   Forster	  
writes.	   As	   Christine	   Van	   Boheemen	  puts	   it,	   “What	   nature	  was	   to	   romanticism,	   the	   body	   is	   to	  
modernism:	  virtually	  lost	  hence	  always	  talked	  about”	  (24).	  
Flesh,	  Machinery,	  and	  the	  Myth	  of	  Transparency	  
Kuno’s	  canonization	  of	   the	  body	  and	  Vashti’s	  abjection	  of	   it	  both	  unwittingly	   fall	  prey	  to	  what	  
Jay	  Bolter	  dubs	  “The	  Myth	  of	  Transparency,”	  namely,	  the	  mistaken	  conviction	  that	  one	  can	  ever	  
have	   “pure,	   unmediated	   experience.”	   But	   such	   an	   error	   is	   understandable.	   When	   everyday	  
human	   activities	   require	   gross	   bodily	   contact	   in	   order	   to	   survive	   (routinely	   walking,	   running,	  
digging	   roots,	   and	   killing	   animals,	   for	   example—everything	   that	   Kuno	   seems	   to	   desire)	   one	  
readily	  naturalizes	  the	  muscular	  body.	  Through	  regular,	  everyday	  use,	  the	  interface	  of	  the	  body	  
disappears	   from	  one’s	   awareness	   as	   an	   interface,	   becoming	   invisible	   as	  mere	   “equipment”	   in	  
Heidegger’s	   terminology.	   Vashti,	   in	   contrast,	   naturalizes	   a	   “post-­‐body”	   Cartesian	   interface	   of	  
sight-­‐privileging,	  hyper-­‐quantified	  mediation	  that	  makes	  the	  corporeal	  body	  into	  an	  objectifying	  
Other.	  However,	  seen	  from	  a	  transhumanist	  perspective,	  Vashti’s	  mechanically-­‐mediated	  body	  
is	  on	  the	  contrary	  extended	  through	  such	  external	  prosthetics	  and	  becomes	  thereby	  enhanced,	  
not	  diminished.	  In	  this	  view,	  Vashti’s	  immersion	  in	  an	  interface-­‐world	  of	  buttons,	  video	  screens	  
and	  tubes	  bestows	  on	  her	  an	  extreme	  “proprioceptive	  coherence”	  (Hayles	  “Condition”	  91)	  with	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the	  Machine.	  Vashti’s	  perception	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  her	  body	  would	   thus	   include	   the	  machine	  
within	  it,	  representing	  a	  state	  of	  literal,	  naturalized	  cyborg-­‐hood	  (which	  perhaps	  presents	  only	  a	  
somewhat	  hyperbolic	  version	  of	  the	  hypermediating	  interfaces,	  iPod	  to	  Bluetooth	  to	  Facebook,	  
already	  so	  prominent	  in	  cyberculture	  today).	  	  
As	  Hayles	  explains	   in	  her	  book	  How	  We	  Became	  Posthuman,	   the	  effect	  of	   such	   interfaces	   is	  a	  
destabilization	  of	  bodily	  and	  subjective	  identity:	  “the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  autonomous	  subject	  are	  
up	   for	   grabs,	   since	   feedback	   loops	   can	   flow	  not	   only	  within	   the	   subject	   but	   also	  between	   the	  
subject	  and	  the	  environment”	  (2).	  For	  Kuno	  and	  Vashti	  both,	  the	  connecting	   interface	  appears	  
natural	   and	   “immediate”	   (the	   latter	   being	   a	   term	   that	   suggests	   not	   only	   rapidity	   but	   also	   an	  
unmediated	   mode	   of	   connection).	   But	   what	   accounts	   for	   the	   seeming	   “immediacy”	   of	   an	  
interface	   (or	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   seemingly	   “given”	   body)	   is	   dictated	   only	   by	   habit,	   not	  
ontology—and	   if	   that	   is	   true,	   can	   either	   one	   of	   these	   interfaces	   claim	   priority	   as	   a	   more	  
“authentic”	  mode	  of	  contact	  with	  the	  world?19	  	  
Forster’s	   valorization	   of	   bodily	   contact	   and	   the	   notion	   that	   it	   constitutes	   direct,	   unmediated	  
connection	   is	   not	   reserved	   only	   for	   Kuno	   and	   naïve	   folk-­‐philosophers,	   however,	   even	   post-­‐
Derrida.	   In	   the	   excellent,	   seminal	   essay	   “Images	   of	   a	   Networked	   Society:	   E.M.	   Forster’s	   ‘The	  
Machine	   Stops’”	  Marcia	  Bundy	   Seabury	   asserts	   that	   “Networked	   life	   consistently	   interposes	   a	  
device	  between	   people	   and	   direct	   experience”	   (66,	   italics	  mine),	  which	   seems	   to	   imply	   that	   if	  
only	   technological	   devices	   were	   removed,	   immediacy	   of	   awareness	   would	   inevitably	   ensue.	  
Similarly,	   in	  his	   essay	   “Telepistemology:	  Descartes’	   Last	   Stand,”	  Hubert	  Dreyfus,	   a	  well-­‐known	  
scholar	  of	  existentialism	  and	  phenomenology,	  naturalizes	  the	  bodily	  interface	  by	  suggesting	  that	  
contemporary	  telepresence	  technologies	  “remain	   isolated	   instances	  of	  mediated	   interaction	   in	  
contrast	   to	   our	   direct	   access	   to	   the	   everyday	   commonsense	  world”	   (56,	   italics	  mine).	   Dreyfus	  
thus	  makes	   the	   divide	   between	   technologically-­‐mediated	   interaction	   and	   gross	   bodily	   contact	  
seem	   unproblematically	   secure—indeed,	   ontologically	   distinct—by	   contrasting	   “tele-­‐
technologies	  and	   the	   telepresence	   they	  deliver	  on	   the	  one	  hand”	  with	   “what	   little	   remains	  of	  
our	  everyday	  unmediated	  interaction	  with	  people	  and	  things,	  on	  the	  other”	  (56,	  italics	  mine).	  	  
But	  the	  carefree	  invocation	  of	  the	  terms	  “direct”	  and	  “everyday”	  here	  by	  Seabury	  and	  Dreyfus	  
ought	   to	   give	   us	   pause.	   Whose	   “everyday”	   are	   we	   talking	   about,	   exactly?	   The	   immediacy	  
humans	  once	   felt	  only	   through	  gross	  physical	   contact	  now	   in	  many	   respects	  has	  given	  way	   to	  
virtualized	  interactions	  that	  now	  feel	  just	  as	  immediate:	  consider	  the	  muscle-­‐memory	  we	  invoke	  
in	   our	   use	   of	   a	   computer	   mouse,	   or	   witness	   our	   effortless	   navigation	   of	   cyberspace	   on	   the	  
world-­‐wide	   web.	   And	   now	   whenever	   you	   mutter	   that	   you	   need	   to	   clean	   your	   “cluttered	  
desktop,”	   chances	   are	   that	   you’re	   not	   talking	   about	   a	   physical	   desk-­‐space	   anymore.	  
Proprioceptive	   coherence	   is	   at	   work	   again,	   extending	   our	   bodily	   boundaries	   to	   include	   the	  
technological	  interfaces	  with	  which	  we	  interact	  routinely.	  It’s	  thus	  not	  the	  body	  per	  se	  that	  feels	  
unmediated,	  but	  rather,	  any	  habitual	  set	  of	  interactions	  that	  does.	  Or,	  another	  way	  to	  put	  this	  
might	  be	  to	  say	  that	  any	  habitual	  set	  of	  interface	  interactions	  actually	  includes	  the	  interface	  as	  
part	   of	   “the	   body”	   as	   it	   is	   phenomenologically	   encountered.	   Technology	   thus	   discloses	   the	  
difficulty	  in	  drawing	  discrete,	  well-­‐defined	  boundaries	  around	  the	  embodied	  self.20	  	  
With	   further	  examination,	   the	  questions	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	   raises	  about	   the	  authenticity	  of	  
mediated	  contact	  become	  progressively	   trickier.	   If	  we	   try	   to	  argue	  not	  merely	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  
habit	   but	   by	   way	   of	   some	  more	   defensible	   criterion,	   consider	   the	   presuppositions	   one	  must	  
invoke	   to	  make	   sense	  of	  what	  me	  mean	  by	   “authentic”	   or	   “unmediated”	   contact	   even	   in	   the	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most	  “everyday”	  of	  circumstances.	  Is	  a	  foot	  a	  more	  “authentic”	  connection	  to	  the	  ground	  than	  
rubber	  tires	  on	  the	  road?	  Kuno	  and	  many	  contemporary	  ecocritics	  would	  insist	  that	  the	  answer	  
is	   yes.	  But	   if	   so,	   then	  why?	   If	  we	  do	  grant	   that	   feet	   are	  more	  authentic	  modes	  of	   connection	  
than	   tires,	  must	  we	   then	   insist	   that	   these	   feet	   be	   bare	   to	   ensure	   “genuine	   contact”	  with	   the	  
earth?	   At	   what	   point	   does	   the	   stripping	   away	   of	   interfaces	   ensure	   that	   one	   is	   at	   last	  
“authentically	   in	   touch”	   with	   nature?	   Consider	   the	   problems	   that	   borderline	   cases	   raise:	   do	  
moccasins	  still	  count?	  What	  about	  sandals?	  Nikes?	  Gortex	  hiking	  boots?	  Prosthetic	  limbs?	  What	  
if	   one’s	   “unmediated”	   nature	   hike	  was	   fueled	   by	   gasoline	   right	   up	   to	   the	   trailhead	   and	   one’s	  
backpack	  lunch	  in	  “nature”	  includes	  an	  organic	  Gala	  apple	  shipped	  in	  by	  fossil-­‐fueled	  machinery	  
all	   the	   way	   from	   New	   Zealand?	   Is	   such	   a	   hybridized	   connection	   with	   the	   landscape	   fleshly,	  
mechanical,	  or	  both?	  	  
If	  we	  press	  this	  argument	  further,	  we	  are	  led	  to	  ask	  why	  certain	  technological	  prosthetics—like	  
eyeglasses	   or	   a	   blind	   man’s	   cane—are	   considered	   more	   “natural”	   than	   artificial	   limbs	   or	  
motorized	   vehicles.	   Is	   there,	   then,	   any	   legitimate	   basis	   for	   naturalizing	   certain	   interfaces	   and	  
“artificializing”	  others?	  On	  these	  lines	  Hannah	  Arendt	  argues	  that	  some	  technologies	  are	  in	  fact	  
more	  natural	  than	  others.	  	  
There	  never	  was	   any	  doubt	   about	  man’s	   being	   adjusted	   to	   the	   tools	   he	  used;	  
one	   might	   as	   well	   adjust	   him	   to	   his	   hands.	   The	   case	   of	   machines	   is	   entirely	  
different.	  Unlike	  the	  tools	  of	  workmanship,	  which	  at	  every	  given	  moment	  in	  the	  
work	  process	  remain	  the	  servants	  of	   the	  hand,	   the	  machines	  demand	  that	   the	  
laborer	   serve	   them,	   that	   he	   adjust	   the	   natural	   rhythm	   of	   this	   body	   to	   their	  
mechanical	  movement.	  (qtd.	  in	  Elkins	  53)	  
At	  first	  Arendt’s	  method	  for	  privileging	  the	  “naturalness”	  of	  certain	  interfaces	  over	  others	  seems	  
promising,	  until	  one	  recalls	  that	  proprioceptive	  coherence	  happens	  not	  only	  with	  hand	  tools	  but	  
also	   between	  humans	   and	   sophisticated	   computers,	   video	   screens,	   cell	   phones,	   and	   everyday	  
machinery	   like	   the	   automobile.	   The	   dividing	   line	   between	   Arendt’s	   “natural”	   tool	   and	  
“unnatural”	  machine	   has	   by	   now	  become	  blurred	   beyond	   hope	   of	   recognition;	   over	   time	   our	  
habitual	  use	  of	  machine	  interfaces	  has	  made	  them	  as	  transparent	  today	  as	  our	  use	  of	  Neolithic	  
grinding	  stones	  might	  have	  been	  ten	  thousand	  years	  ago.	  If	  such	  issues	  seem	  problematic	  right	  
now,	   imagine	  how	   thorny	   they	  will	  become	  when	   in	   the	  near	   future	   robotic	  exoskeletons	  will	  
enable	  literally	  anyone	  to	  hike	  tall	  mountains	  by	  doing	  little	  more	  than	  twitch	  their	  muscles	  to	  
trigger	  mechanical	  servo-­‐motors.21	  Kuno’s	  myth	  of	  the	  pure	  body,	  and	  Forster’s	  suggestion	  that	  
an	  originary	  body	   lies	  beneath	  the	  dress	  of	  culture,	  are	  poorly	  equipped	  to	  help	  us	  resolve	  (or	  
even	  debate)	  such	  complex	  and	  vexing	  questions.	  	  
But	  Kuno	  is	  far	  from	  alone	  in	  naturalizing	  the	  bodily	  interface	  and	  thereby	  privileging	  the	  illusion	  
of	   fleshly	   transparency.	  Many	   of	   us	   (especially	   nature	  writers	   and	   those	   in	   ecocritical	   circles)	  
readily	  do	   so,	   consciously	  or	  not.	  And	  even	   though	  equating	   flesh	  with	   immediacy	   is	   (I	  would	  
contend)	   a	   mistake,	   Dreyfus	   and	   others	   are	   absolutely	   right	   that	   something	   existentially	  
significant	   happens	   to	   us	   based	   on	   our	   specific	   modes	   of	   interaction	   with	   the	   world.	   Just	  
because	  all	  contact	  must	  be	  mediated	  somehow,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  no	  value	  distinctions	  can	  
be	  made	  between	  different	  modes	   of	  mediation.	   In	  Understanding	  Media,	  Marshall	  McLuhan	  
made	  the	  vital	  point	  that	  technologies	  in	  fact	  extend	  the	  body—but	  always	  at	  some	  cost.	  As	  he	  
put	   it,	  “Extensions	  alter	  perceptions”—and,	  significantly,	  they	  amputate	  at	  the	  very	  same	  time	  
they	   amplify.	   Using	   a	   foot	   for	   locomotion	   brings	   forth	   a	   radically	   different	   world,	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phenomenologically	   speaking,	   depending	   on	   whether	   it	   is	   used	   to	   walk	   or	   to	   press	   a	   car’s	  
accelerator	  pedal.	  Employing	  the	  foot	  to	  hit	  the	  gas	  can	  lead	  to	  enchantment—a	  delight	  in	  the	  
amplified	   aesthetics	   of	   whirr	   and	   blur—but	   with	   it	   comes	   alienation	   from	   the	   loss	   of	   other	  
modes	   of	   sensory	   contact	   such	   as	   touch	   and	   smell	   that	   one	   encounters	   when	   walking.	  
Ultimately,	   the	   very	   perception	  of	  what	   counts	   as	   “self”	   or	   “body”	   in	   the	   first	   place	  becomes	  
altered	  by	  the	  bodily	  or	  technological	  interfaces	  one	  uses.	  As	  we	  interact	  in	  our	  everyday	  world	  
through	   interfaces,	  we	  often	  become	  blind	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  are	   interfaces	  at	  all—and	  we	  
typically	   only	   notice	   them	   when	   they	   become	   fatigued	   or	   stop	   working	   properly.	   Kuno,	   in	  
contrast,	   wants	   to	   be	   constantly	   reminded	   of	   the	   fleshly	   interface	   of	   his	   body	   by	   working	   it	  
repeatedly	   it	   until	   it	   aches,	   in	   order	   that	   he	   might	   feel	   constantly	   present	   in	   the	   processes	  
involved	   in	   his	   own	   locomotion.22	   For	   Kuno,	   the	   use	   of	   the	   body	   thus	   represents	   a	   powerful	  
mode	   of	   resistance	   to	   the	  Machine	   because	   it	   reclaims	   human	   agency	   in	   the	   performance	   of	  
everyday	  activities.	  	  
Like	   Kuno,	   most	   of	   us	   perceive	   some	   modes	   of	   interaction	   as	   distinctively	   “more	   real”	   than	  
others—however	   hard	   this	   might	   be	   to	   demonstrate—and	   not	  merely	   as	   “different.”	   It	   feels	  
“more	   real”	   to	   actually	   touch	   skin	   to	   sandstone	   and	   feel	   its	   gritty	   texture	   slide	   between	   our	  
fingertips	   than	   to	   sit	   inside	   a	   climate	   controlled	   automobile	   behind	   tinted	   glass	   and	   just	  
“spectate.”	  Reality,	  as	  Kant	  hinted	  long	  ago,	  seems	  to	  inhere	  in	  what	  resists	  or	  “pushes	  back.”	  In	  
Desert	  Solitaire,	  Edward	  Abbey	  famously	  argued	  that	  you	  can’t	  see	  anything	  in	  the	  Arches	  until	  
you	  get	  out	  of	  your	  car	  and	  drag	  your	  body	  across	  slickrock	  till	  you	  leave	  a	  trail	  of	  blood	  in	  your	  
wake.	  Perhaps	  he’s	  right.	  All	  that	  concerns	  me	  in	  such	  assessments	  is	  how	  we	  so	  easily	  employ	  
the	   standards	   of	   our	   own	   “everyday”	   circumstances	   to	   dictate	   what	   counts	   as	   “real”	   vs.	  
“inauthentic”	  encounters	  with	  the	  landscape	  in	  such	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  world.23	  We’ve	  already	  
naturalized	  the	   interface	  of	  the	  shoe,	  the	  eyeglass,	  and	  the	  contact	   lens	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  
they	  feel	  simply	  “given”	  when	  in	  fact	  these	  all	  were	  once	  radically	  new	  technologies.	  Whatever	  
the	   future	   might	   be,	   its	   “everyday”	   will	   not	   be	   our	   everyday,	   so	   to	   responsibly	   examine	  
questions	   as	   to	   what	   counts	   as	   authentic	   “connection”	   (connection	   being	   of	   course	   Forster’s	  
lingering	  concern	   throughout	  his	  works)	  demands	   that	  we	  use	  criteria	  other	   than	   those	  which	  
merely	  feel	  “natural”	  to	  us	  at	  any	  given	  state	  of	  technological	  development.24	  	  
If	   Forster’s	   dystopian	   fable	   seems	   at	   all	   compelling	   today,	   one-­‐hundred	   years	   after	   its	   initial	  
publication,	   it	   might	   be	   for	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	  Marcia	   Bundy	   Seabury	   suggests,	   namely	   that	  
totalitarian	   dystopias	   like	   1984	   seem	   right	   now	   “less	   imminent	   than	   Forster’s	   of	   satisfied	  
individuals	   sitting	   before	   their	   personal	   computers”	   (61).	   She	   goes	   on	   to	   raise	   the	   vital	   allied	  
point	   that	   in	   Forster’s	  world	  of	   the	  Machine,	   “People	   see	  not	   the	   forces	  of	   nature	  but	   rather	  
only	  the	  machine	  and	  the	  walls	  of	  their	  man-­‐made	  rooms	  […]	  shut	  off	  visually	  from	  a	  world	  they	  
did	  not	  make”	  (63).	  This	   insight	  highlights	  the	  peculiar	  ecocritical	  significance	  of	  Forster’s	  fable	  
in	  showing	  how	  not	  only	  the	  representation	  of	  nature,	  but	  the	  failure	  to	  represent	  nature,	  itself	  
betrays	  a	  particular	  ecological	  world	   view.	   For	   the	  denizens	  of	   the	  Machine,	   the	  Machine	   is	   a	  
self-­‐enclosing	   all.	   Outside	   its	   Cartesian	   theater	   there	   exists	   no	   “big	   outside”	   (to	   invoke	   Dave	  
Foreman’s	   term	   for	   wild	   places)	   to	   count	   as	   a	   reference	   point	   for	   either	   health	   or	   sublimity.	  
Vashti	   deflates	   any	   such	   potential	   in	   her	   blanket	   condemnation	   of	   the	   surface	  world	   as	   seen	  
from	  the	  airship:	  “There	  are	  no	  ideas	  here”	  (103).	  	  
Keeping	  such	  concerns	  in	  mind,	  perhaps	  a	  useful	  ecocritical	  approach	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  role	  
of	   technology	   in	   “connecting,”	   then,	   might	   be	   to	   shift	   one’s	   focus.	   Instead	   of	   asking	   if	   a	  
particular	  embodied	  (or	  disembodied)	  mode	  of	  connection	  is	  “authentic,”	  one	  might	  ask	  instead	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with	   whom	   (or	   what)	   one	   connects	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   In	   a	   world	   (like	   Vashti’s)	   in	   which	  
everything	  one	  encounters	   is	   either	   human	  or	   human-­‐produced,	   the	  more-­‐than-­‐human	  Other	  
vanishes,	  and	  any	  perceived	  relationship	  with	  it	  is	  severed.	  But	  holding	  technological	  prosthetics	  
liable	  for	  such	  dissociation,	  as	  Kuno	  does,	  is	  over-­‐simple.	  Recollect	  the	  iconic	  image	  of	  the	  boot	  
in	   the	   film	  WALL-­‐E	   in	   which	   this	   man-­‐made	   interface	   in	   fact	   reconnects	   people	   to	   the	   earth	  
rather	  than	  dissociating	  them	  from	  it.	  Likewise,	  in	  James	  Cameron’s	  recent	  film	  Avatar,	  only	  by	  
inhabiting	  remotely	  controlled	  bodies	  are	  humans	  once	  again	  able	  to	  re-­‐connect	  with	  nature.	  In	  
Interface	  Culture,	  Steven	  Johnson	  further	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  present-­‐day	  information	  age,	  the	  
model	   of	   technology	   in	   terms	   of	   prosthetics	   has	   become	   outmoded.	   Extending	  McLuhan,	   he	  
contends	   that	   through	   virtual	   realities	  we	   now	   inhabit	   competing	   environments,	   some	   virtual	  
and	  some	  natural,	  instead.	  For	  ecologically	  concerned	  authors	  like	  Richard	  Louv	  (Last	  Child	  in	  the	  
Woods),	  technology	  and	  virtuality	  substitute	  for	  physical	  connection	  to	  wild	  places	  and	  thereby	  
threaten	   to	   make	   nature	   passé,	   depriving	   human	   beings	   (especially	   children)	   of	   the	   physical	  
connections	   required	   to	   make	   them	   fully	   human.	   In	   this	   view,	   techno-­‐mediated	   nature	   and	  
virtual	  landscapes	  evacuate	  the	  earth	  of	  aura.	  	  
Forster	  echoes	  this	  perception	   in	  “The	  Machine	  Stops,”	  where	  machine-­‐dominated	   landscapes	  
and	  technical	  mediations	  mean	  that	  “All	  the	  old	  literature,	  with	  its	  praise	  of	  Nature,	  and	  its	  fear	  
of	   nature,	   rang	   false	   as	   the	   prattle	   of	   a	   child”	   (98).	   Visual	   and	   sonic	   representations,	   both	  
indefinitely	  replicable	  and	  playable	  on	  demand,	  drain	  potency	  from	  concrete	  physical	  presences;	  
the	  hyperreal	  overtakes	  and	  subsumes	  the	  wild	  by	  becoming	  “better	  than	  the	  real	  thing.”	   In	  a	  
recent	   NPR	   story	   discussing	   the	   declining	   number	   of	   visits	   to	   national	   parks,	   environmental	  
historian	  Mark	  Barrow	  similarly	  wonders	  if	  nature	  has	  now	  become	  “a	  place	  best	  seen	  at	  zoos	  or	  
on	  plasma-­‐screen	  TVs,”	  which	  has	  led	  him	  to	  dub	  the	  21st	  century	  “the	  era	  of	  mediated	  nature.”	  
Forster	   anticipates	   such	   a	   condition	  when	  his	   narrator	   states	   that	   “Those	  who	   still	  wanted	   to	  
know	  what	  the	  earth	  was	  like	  had	  after	  all	  only	  to	  listen	  to	  some	  gramophone	  or	  look	  into	  some	  
cinematophote”	  (114).	  
But	   is	   the	  problem	  with	  “mediated	  nature”	  the	  simple	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  mediated	  (an	   inescapable	  
condition	  always	  at	  some	  level),	  or	  rather	  that	  with	  certain	  types	  of	  mediation	  comes	  a	  loss	  of	  
connection	  with	  the	  Other,	  particularly	  wild	  places?	  Marshall	  McLuhan,	  often	  represented	  as	  an	  
unmitigated	   technophile,	   argues	   intriguingly	   that	   one	   major	   problem	   with	   technological	  
mediation	   is	   in	   fact	   the	  threat	   it	  poses	   to	  alterity.	  McLuhan	  would	  probably	  consider	  Forster’s	  
Machine-­‐world	  a	  paradigm	  case	  of	  what	  he	  called	  “Narcissus	  as	  Narcosis.”	   In	  the	  chapter	  “The	  
Gadget	  Lover”	  from	  Understanding	  Media,	  McLuhan	  contends	  that	  the	  classic	  Narcissus	  myth	  is	  
misread	  when	   construed	   as	   that	   of	   a	   boy	   falling	   in	   love	   with	   himself.	   In	   the	   story,	   Narcissus	  
doesn’t	  actually	  realize	  that	  the	  reflection	  he	  so	  adores	  is	  really	  an	  image	  of	  himself.	  In	  just	  this	  
way,	  McLuhan	  continues,	   technological	   extensions	   create	   the	   illusion	  of	  Otherness	  when	   they	  
really	  only	  provide	  a	  hall	  of	  mirrors	   for	   infinitely	   reflecting	  humanity	  back	   to	   itself.25	  Narcissus	  
also	   produces	   narcosis,	   or	   numbness,	   by	   dulling	   sensations	   that	   would	   otherwise	   reveal	   that	  
we’re	  really	  only	  in	  contact	  with—and	  only	  seem	  to	  desire—our	  own	  productions	  and	  our	  own	  
reflections,	   not	   contact	   with	   genuine	   “Others.”26	   In	   case	   the	   threat	   of	   lost	   contact	   with	   the	  
Other	   seems	   insufficiently	   concerning,	   consider	   a	   possibility	   that	   proponents	   of	  Deep	   Ecology	  
raise,	   namely	   that	   our	   very	   identity	   is	   constructed	   only	   through	   such	   relations.	   Philosopher	  
David	  Abram	  likewise	  insists,	  for	  example,	  that	  	  
Humans	   are	   tuned	   for	   relationship.	   The	   eyes,	   the	   skin,	   the	   tongue,	   ears,	   and	  
nostrils—all	   are	  gates	  where	  our	  body	   receives	   the	  nourishment	  of	  otherness.	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[…]	  we	  are	  human	  only	   in	  contact,	   in	  conviviality,	  with	  what	   is	  not	  human.	   […]	  
Direct	   sensuous	   reality,	   in	   all	   its	  more-­‐than-­‐human	  mystery,	   remains	   the	   solid	  
touchstone	   for	   an	   experiential	   world	   now	   inundated	   with	   electronically-­‐
generated	   vistas	   and	   engineered	   pleasures;	   only	   in	   regular	   contact	   with	   the	  
tangible	   ground	   and	   sky	   can	   we	   learn	   how	   to	   orient	   and	   to	   navigate	   in	   the	  
multiple	  dimensions	  that	  now	  claim	  us.	  (Abram	  ix)	  
Unlike	  Vashti,	  Abram	  conceives	  the	  human	  being	  as	   in	  no	  way	  eccentric	  to	  the	  physical	  world.	  
Far	   from	   representing	   the	   human	   being	   as	   a	   self-­‐contained,	   immaterial,	   rational	   mind	   (like	  
Vashti),	   Abram	   construes	   selfhood	   as	   constituted	   wholly	   by	   its	   relationship	   to	   a	   more-­‐than-­‐
human,	  more-­‐than-­‐rational	  set	  of	  fellow	  characters.	   If	  Abram	  is	  right,	  then	  unless	  we	  routinely	  
interface	   our	   bodies	   with	   the	   more-­‐than-­‐human	   world,	   through	   our	   isolation	   we	   risk	   losing	  
something	  essential	  to	  our	  humanness.	  This	  ecocritical	  viewpoint	  highlights	  how	  it	  is	  not	  just	  the	  
earth	  that	  is	  threatened,	  but	  us:	  lacking	  a	  vital	  connection	  to	  wild	  nature,	  people	  are	  in	  danger	  
of	   devolving	   into	   quasi-­‐human	   simulacra.	   Kevin	   DeLuca	   calls	   this	   condition	   of	   self-­‐enclosed	  
communication	   “technosoliloquy.”	   The	   hypermediating	   modes	   of	   contact	   that	   networked	  
computing	   provides	   should	   therefore	   give	   us	   serious	   pause	   and	  make	   us	   question	   to	   whom,	  
exactly,	  we	  are	  networked—and	  who	  gets	  excluded.	  We	  ought	  also	  to	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  
as	  human	   individuals	  we	  still	  possess	   the	  bandwidth	  needed	  to	  experience	   the	  world	   invoking	  
more	   senses	   than	   the	   visual,	   and	   ask	   if	   we	   still	   remember	   the	   protocols	   required	   to	   connect	  
ourselves	   with	   the	   furred,	   creeping,	   burrowing,	   flying,	   and	   flowing	   more-­‐than-­‐human	  
inhabitants	  of	  the	  earthly	  landscape.	  Do	  we	  hear	  the	  hum	  of	  insects	  anymore,	  or	  only	  that	  of	  our	  
desktop	  machines?	  	  
Despite	  its	  excessive	  optimism	  at	  reclaiming	  “beautiful	  naked	  man”	  and	  for	  escaping	  wholesale	  
from	  technological	  mediation,	   “The	  Machine	  Stops”	   succeeds	  admirably	   in	   forecasting	   specific	  
liabilities	  inhering	  in	  21st	  century	  cyberculture	  and	  in	  exposing	  the	  facile	  notion	  that	  technology	  
can	  provide	  amplification	  without	  loss.	  Through	  habitual	  use,	  technologies	  that	  amplify	  the	  body	  
inevitably	  substitute	  for	  and	  displace	  corporeal	  modes	  of	  awareness—or	   in	  the	  very	   least	  they	  
hybridize	  with	  the	  body	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  makes	  the	  distinction	  between	  body	  and	  technology	  all	  
the	  more	  difficult	  to	  sort	  out.	  Even	  if	  Forster’s	  dream	  of	  reclaiming	  a	  technologically-­‐unfettered	  
human	  body	  succumbs	  to	  a	  modernist	  nostalgia	  for	  something	  that	  never	  existed,	  he	  is	  right	  to	  
represent	   grim	   and	   alienating	   possibilities	   if	   we	   plug	   ourselves	   into	   modes	   of	   awareness	  
mediated	   exclusively	   by	   machinery	   and	   telepresence	   technologies.	   If	   we	   are	   to	   keep	   fleshly	  
modes	  of	  “only	  connecting”	   intact	   in	   the	  21st	  century	  and	  beyond,	  we	  might	  be	  required	  to	   in	  
some	   part	   “only	   disconnect”	   from	   those	   interactions—machine-­‐mediated	   or	   not—that	  
disembody	  us.	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2	   “The	  Machine	   Stops,"	   a	   roughly	   12,000	   word	   short	   story	   by	   E.M.	   Forster,	   was	   first	   published	   in	   The	  
Oxford	  and	  Cambridge	  Review	  in	  November,	  1909.	  It	  was	  later	  included	  in	  the	  collection	  The	  Eternal	  
Moment	  and	  Other	  Stories	  in	  1928.	  The	  version	  I	  examine	  here	  is	  from	  E.M.	  Forster,	  Selected	  Stories,	  
edited	  by	  David	   Leavitt	   and	  Mark	  Mitchell	   (New	  York:	   Penguin,	   2001).	   Few	   in-­‐depth	  discussions	  of	  
“The	  Machine	  Stops”	  exist.	  Two	  books	  that	  do	  examine	  it	  at	  some	  length	  include	  Tom	  Moylan,	  Scraps	  
of	   the	   Untainted	   Sky:	   Science	   Fiction,	   Utopia,	   Dystopia	   (Boulder:	   West	   View,	   2000)	   and	   Mark	   R.	  
Hillegas,	   The	   Future	   as	   Nightmare:	   H.G.	  Wells	   and	   the	   Anti-­‐utopians	   (New	   York:	   Oxford	   University	  
Press,	  1967).	  Both	  texts	  emphasize	  the	  story’s	  seminal	  role	  in	  20th	  century	  dystopian	  literature,	  and	  in	  
particular,	   its	   function	  as	  a	   response	   to	   technological	  utopianism	   in	  H.G.	  Wells.	   In	  contrast,	   in	   their	  
introduction	  to	  Forster’s	  Selected	  Stories	  (New	  York:	  Penguin,	  2001),	  David	  Leavitt	  and	  Mark	  Mitchell	  
highlight	  how	  Forster’s	  story	  satirizes	  Oscar	  Wilde’s	  media-­‐hungry	  “Critic	  as	  Artist.”	  In	  the	  past	  thirty	  
years,	   fewer	   than	   a	   dozen	   academic	   articles	   have	   focused	   specifically	   on	   “The	   Machine	   Stops.”	  
Charles	  Elkins’	  essay	  “E.M.	  Forster’s	   ‘The	  Machine	  Stops’:	  Liberal-­‐Humanist	  Hostility	   to	  Technology”	  
from	  the	  anthology	  Clockwork	  Worlds	  (1983)	  performs	  a	  strong	  reading	  of	  technological	  mediation	  in	  
Forster’s	   text,	   speculating	   on	   not	   only	   the	   effects,	   but	   also	   the	   possible	   causes,	   of	   excessive	  
technological	  mediation.	  Gorman	  Beauchamp’s	  1986	  essay	  in	  Modern	  Fiction	  Studies,	  “Technology	  in	  
the	  Dystopian	  Novel”	  showcases	  Forster’s	  story	  as	  a	  “true	  technotopia”	  (57)	  in	  which	  technology	  acts	  
as	  an	  autonomous	  force	  fully	  determining	  cultural	   ideology.	  More	  recently,	  Marcia	  Bundy	  Seabury’s	  
“Images	  of	  a	  Networked	  Society:	  E.	  M.	  Forster's	  'The	  Machine	  Stops'”	  (1997)	  and	  Silvana	  Caporaletti’s	  
“Science	  as	  Nightmare:	  'The	  Machine	  Stops'	  by	  E.	  M.	  Forster”	  (1997)	  are	  particularly	  noteworthy	  for	  
addressing	  the	  newfound	  relevance	  of	  Forster’s	  text	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  Internet-­‐culture.	  
3	   I	   should	   emphasize	   that	   Forster’s	   view	   is	   not	   simply	   anti-­‐technological.	   For	   Forster,	   the	   test	   of	   a	  
technology’s	   value	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   bound	   up	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   either	   foster	   or	   undermine	  
“connection.”	  Ian	  Carter	  argues	  that	  although	  Forster	  considered	  automobile	  travel	  uncouth,	  for	  him	  
the	  railway	  was	  “culturally	  neutral”	  and	  perhaps	  even	  capable	  of	   living	  up	  to	   its	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
moniker	  of	  “Great	  Connector”—as	  suggested	  in	  this	  passage	  from	  Howards	  End:	  “[Hilton]	  station,	  like	  
the	  scenery,	  like	  Helen’s	  letters,	  struck	  an	  indeterminate	  note.	  Into	  which	  country	  will	  it	  lead,	  England	  
or	  Suburbia?	  It	  was	  new,	  it	  had	  island	  platforms	  and	  a	  subway,	  and	  the	  superficial	  comfort	  exacted	  by	  
business	   men.	   But	   it	   also	   held	   hints	   of	   local	   life,	   personal	   intercourse”	   (qtd.	   in	   Carter	   243).	   For	  
Margaret	   Schlegel	   in	   Howards	   End,	   certainly	   the	   railway	   should	   not	   be	   held	   culpable	   for	   any	  
technologically-­‐induced	  disenchantment;	   rather,	   she	  “had	  strong	   feelings	  about	   the	  various	   railway	  
termini.	   They	   are	   our	   gates	   to	   the	   glorious	   and	   the	   unknown.	   Through	   them	   we	   pass	   out	   into	  
adventure	   and	   sunshine,	   to	   them,	   alas!	   we	   return	   […]	   the	   station	   of	   King’s	   Cross	   had	   always	  
suggested	  Infinity”	  (Forster	  Howards	  End	  10).	  
4	   In	   case	  my	   use	   of	   the	   term	   “ecocritical”	   here	   seems	   over-­‐broad,	   by	   using	   it	   I	   mean	   an	   analysis	   that	  
examines	  how	  texts	  represent	  the	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  the	  natural	  environment	  (see	  
Greg	  Garrard’s	  Ecocriticism	  5).	  Of	  course,	  narrowly	  speaking,	  ecocriticism’s	   task	   is	   to	  examine	  “the	  
relationship	  between	  literature	  and	  the	  physical	  environment”	  (Glotfelty	  and	  Fromm	  xviii).	  But	  I	  find	  
more	   helpful	   Camilo	   Gomides’	   broader	   conception	   in	   which	   ecocriticism	   “analyzes	   and	   promotes	  
works	  of	  art	  which	  raise	  moral	  questions	  about	  human	  interactions	  with	  nature”	  (qtd.	  in	  Phillips	  16).	  
In	  this	  vein	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  ecocritical	  inquiry	  is	  best	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
questions	   texts	   raise	   rather	   than	   in	   terms	   of	  what	   they	   explicitly	   represent.	   “The	  Machine	   Stops”	  
excels	   in	   raising	   questions	   about	   sensation-­‐based	   vs.	  mental	  modes	   of	   interaction	  with	   the	   earth,	  
even	  though	  little	  in	  it	  overtly	  depicts	  nature	  per	  se.	  
5	   In	  the	  world	  of	  the	  Machine,	  touching	  buttons	  displaces	  every	  other	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  might	  stay	  “in	  
touch”:	  “Then	  she	  generated	  the	  light,	  and	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  room,	  flooded	  with	  radiance	  and	  studded	  
with	  electric	  buttons,	  revived	  her.	  There	  were	  buttons	  and	  switches	  everywhere—buttons	  to	  call	  for	  
food,	   for	   music,	   for	   clothing.	   There	   was	   the	   hot-­‐bath	   button,	   by	   pressure	   of	   which	   a	   basin	   of	  
(imitation)	  marble	   rose	  out	  of	   the	   floor,	   filled	   to	   the	  brim	  with	  a	  warm	  deodorized	   liquid.	   […]	  The	  
room,	  though	  it	  contained	  nothing,	  was	  in	  touch	  with	  all	  that	  she	  cared	  for	  in	  the	  world”	  (Forster	  94).	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6	  Note	  how	  Vashi’s	  urge	  toward	  the	  abstract	  in	  this	  utterance	  inverts	  the	  Imagists’	  credo,	  “No	  ideas	  but	  in	  
things”	  (i.e.,	  for	  Vashti	  it	  would	  seem	  there	  are	  “No	  things	  but	  in	  ideas”!).	  
7	   Another	   reason	  why	   the	  Machine	   privileges	   the	   visual	   field	   is	   because	   vision	   is	   able	   to	   keep	   self	   and	  
Other	  tidily	  distinct.	  As	  Theodor	  Adorno	  and	  Max	  Horkheimer	  point	  out	   in	  their	  essay	  “Elements	  of	  
Anti-­‐Semitism,”	  other	  sensations	  like	  smell	  do	  not	  keep	  boundaries	  safely	  secured	  like	  vision	  does:	  	  
	  
In	  the	  ambiguous	  partialities	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  smell	  the	  old	  nostalgia	  for	  what	  is	  lower	  lives	  on,	  
the	   longing	   for	   immediate	   union	   with	   surrounding	   nature,	   with	   earth	   and	   slime.	   Of	   all	   the	  
senses	  the	  act	  of	  smelling,	  which	  is	  attracted	  without	  objectifying,	  reveals	  most	  sensuously	  the	  
urge	  to	  lose	  oneself	  in	  identification	  with	  the	  other.	  That	  is	  why	  smell,	  as	  both	  the	  perception	  
and	  the	  perceived—which	  are	  one	   in	  the	  act	  of	  olfaction—is	  more	  expressive	  than	  the	  other	  
senses.	  When	  we	  see	  we	  remain	  who	  we	  are,	  when	  we	  smell	  we	  are	  absorbed	  entirely.	  (151)	  	  
	  
Others	  can	  be	  kept	  Other,	  easily,	  if	  the	  only	  threat	  of	  contact	  is	  by	  way	  of	  photon	  or	  lightwave.	  Moreover,	  
the	  reduction	  of	  the	  world	  to	  visual	  sensation	  provides	  the	   illusion	  that	  one	  can	  not	  only	  represent	  
the	  world	  accurately,	  but	  also	  act	  on	  that	  world	  “from	  a	  distance”	  without	  being	  affected	  by	  it	  in	  turn.	  
The	  world	  stays	  safely	  Other	  without	  risk	  of	  it	  infecting	  the	  self;	  consequently,	  visual	  sensation	  is	  the	  
least	  susceptible	  to	  threats	  from	  the	  abject	  (smell	  and	  taste	  would	  in	  contrast	  be	  most	  at	  risk).	  In	  such	  
respects	   it	   is	  significant	  Vashti’s	  son	  Kuno,	   thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  her,	   tells	  her	   through	  the	  
machine	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  see	  her	  in	  person	  and	  never	  again	  through	  the	  machine.	  
8	  Caporaletti	  does	  excellent	  work	  situating	  Kuno’s	  (and	  Forster’s)	  resistance	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  machine-­‐
measure	   by	   arguing	   that	   “The	   Machine	   Stops”	   is	   not	   merely	   “a	   neo-­‐Luddite	   assault”	   (Alexandra	  
Aldridge’s	   term)	   but	   rather	   a	   “campaign	   […]	   against	   the	   blindness	   of	   an	   absurd	   scientific	  
fundamentalism	  that	  prefers	  to	  ignore	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  an	  excess	  of	  mechanization	  and	  
technology	  and	  its	  inevitable	  effects	  on	  man’s	  life.	  […]	  A	  liberal	  and	  a	  humanist	  at	  heart,	  Forster	  does	  
not	  believe	  in	  a	  scientific	  panacea;	  indeed	  he	  fears	  that	  the	  progressive	  mechanization	  of	  the	  human	  
environment,	  accomplished	  with	  the	  illusion	  of	  rendering	  it	  more	  and	  more	  adequate	  to	  man’s	  needs,	  
might	  instead	  in	  time	  reduce	  man	  to	  the	  measure	  of	  his	  artificial	  environment”	  (38).	  
9	   In	   line	  with	  Kuno’s	  desire	  for	  self-­‐originating	  bodily	  action,	  Beatrice	  Battaglia	  points	  out	  that	  the	  name	  
“Kuno”	   suggests	   the	  Greek	   root	   for	  motion,	  kinesis	   (66).	   But	   so,	   too,	   does	   the	  word	   “cinema”—an	  
interesting	  point	  considering	  how	  Kuno’s	  goal	  is	  to	  eliminate	  technological	  mediation	  and	  the	  cinema	  
in	  many	  ways	  is	  paradigmatic	  of	  it.	  
10	  Kuno’s	  disdain	  for	  machinery	  and	  his	  zeal	  for	  corporeal	  interaction	  here	  mirror	  the	  body-­‐affirmation	  of	  
other	   prominent	   characters	   in	   modernist	   fiction,	   for	   example	   Constance	   Chatterley’s	   desire	   to	  
obscure	   the	   face	   and	   evade	   the	   sterile	   “mental	   life”	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   vitality	   of	   the	   loins	   in	   D.H.	  
Lawrence’s	  Lady	  Chatterley’s	  Lover	  (1928).	  In	  Forster’s	  own	  novel	  Howards	  End	  (1910),	  Leonard	  Bast’s	  
account	  of	  his	  long	  walk	  out	  of	  London	  draws	  praise	  from	  the	  Schlegel	  sisters—but	  only	  for	  as	  long	  as	  
he	  confines	  his	  narrative	  to	  the	  sheer	  physicality	  demanded	  by	  his	  pastoral	  excursion.	  The	  moment	  
he	  begins	  to	  mediate	  his	  account	  with	  literary	  embellishments,	  it	  becomes	  drained	  of	  sincerity.	  Such	  
characters	  are	  all	  of	  course	  emblematic	  of	  a	  more	  general	  modernist	  urge	  to	  reclaim	  the	  “lost”	  body	  
(see	  Van	  Boheemen	  24).	  Although	  certain	  aspects	  of	  modernism	   (such	  as	  Futurism)	  are	   sometimes	  
equated	  with	  rejection	  of	  the	  body,	  such	  an	  understanding	  mistakenly	  equates	  praise	  of	  the	  machine	  
with	  a	  devaluation	  of	  the	  flesh.	  But	  when	  in	  1905	  the	  Futurist	  Marinetti	  declared	  “Hoorah!	  No	  more	  
contact	  with	  the	  vile	  earth!”	  (qtd.	  in	  Virilio	  73)	  he	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  seeking	  to	  evade	  corporeality.	  Far	  
from	  it;	  like	  other	  members	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde,	  Marinetti	  yearned	  foremost	  simply	  to	  “make	  it	  new.”	  
Marinetti’s	   “vile	   earth”	   represented	   stasis,	   limitation,	   and	   the	   passé;	   nature	   was	   to	   be	   abjected	  
primarily	  because	  it	  was	  “the	  given,”	  too	  old,	  obsolete.	  The	  avant-­‐garde	  artist	  in	  contrast	  inhabited	  a	  
world	  which	  required	  active	  transformation	  by	  art	  (one	  can	  detect	  similar	  sentiments	  in	  Whistler	  and	  
Wilde	   on	   nature	   as	   aesthetic	   failure	   in	   the	   two	   decades	   prior).	   For	   Marinetti,	   it	   was	   the	  
transformation	   of	   inert	   earthly	   elements	   into	   a	   frenzy	   of	   motion	   that	   inspired:	   “We	   say	   that	   the	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world’s	  magnificence	  has	  been	  enriched	  by	  a	  new	  beauty;	   the	  beauty	  of	  speed.	  A	  racing	  car	  whose	  
hood	  is	  adorned	  with	  great	  pipes,	  like	  serpents	  of	  explosive	  breath—a	  roaring	  car	  that	  seems	  to	  ride	  
on	  grapeshot—is	  more	  beautiful	  than	  the	  Victory	  of	  Samothrace”	  (Marinetti	  187).	  Thus,	  Futurist	  art	  
idealized	   machines	   as	   a	   breed	   of	   feral	   technology	   capable	   of	   outstripping	   lifeless	   sculpture	   from	  
antiquity.	   Marinetti’s	   fascination	   with	   industrial-­‐era	   technology	   was	   moreover	   motivated	   by	   his	  
capacity	  to	  “animalize”	  it;	  for	  him,	  rail	  technology	  suggested	  not	  dead	  matter	  in	  motion,	  but	  “deep-­‐
chested	  locomotives	  whose	  wheels	  paw	  the	  tracks	  like	  the	  hooves	  of	  enormous	  steel	  horses”	  (187).	  
In	  these	  ways	  Futurism	  fused	  vitalism	  with	  mechanism;	  according	  to	  one	  critic,	  Marinetti’s	  goal	  was	  
thus	  not	  to	  transcend	  the	  flesh	  but	  to	  unite	  it	  with	  the	  machine	  in	  “a	  mechanical	  pantheism	  in	  which	  
the	  machine	  acquires	  a	  soul	  and	  the	  mind	  becomes	  a	  motor”	  (Poplawski	  152).	  
11	  Along	  these	  lines,	  Aldous	  Huxley	  observed,	  “…technology	  was	  made	  for	  man,	  not	  man	  for	  technology,	  
but	  unfortunately	  [we	  have]	  created	  a	  world	  in	  which	  man	  seems	  to	  be	  made	  for	  technology…We	  do	  
have	  to	  start	  thinking	  how	  we	  can	  get	  control	  again	  of	  our	  inventions.	  This	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  Frankenstein	  
monster	  problem”	  (qtd.	  in	  Elkins	  50).	  
12	  When	   I	   last	   taught	   “The	  Machine	   Stops”	   in	  my	   environmental	   literature	   class,	  many	   of	  my	   students	  
found	   it	   compelling	   and	   thought-­‐provoking—and	   challenging	   to	   their	   everyday	  use	  of	   telepresence	  
technologies	   like	   the	   Internet	   and	   cell	   phones.	  One	   student	   even	   swore	   off	   her	   computer	   (not	  my	  
intention)	  and	  turned	  in	  papers	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  semester	  using	  a	  manual	  typewriter.	  (I	  didn’t	  have	  
the	  heart	  to	  remind	  her	  that	  the	  typewriter	  was	  itself	  a	  radically	  novel	  technology	  only	  a	  century-­‐and-­‐
a-­‐half	  ago!)	  
13	   Douglas	   Adams	   expressed	   this	   failure	   of	   technological	   awareness	  with	   characteristic	  wit	   in	   his	   essay	  
“How	  to	  Stop	  Worrying	  and	  Love	  the	  Internet,”	  published	  in	  1999:	  
	  
	   everything	  that’s	  already	  in	  the	  world	  when	  you’re	  born	  is	  just	  normal;	  	  
anything	  that	  gets	   invented	  between	  then	  and	  before	  you	  turn	  thirty	   is	   incredibly	  exciting	  
and	  creative	  and	  with	  any	  luck	  you	  can	  make	  a	  career	  out	  of	  it;	  	  
anything	  that	  gets	  invented	  after	  you’re	  thirty	  is	  against	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things	  and	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  end	  of	  civilisation	  as	  we	  know	  it	  until	  it’s	  been	  around	  for	  about	  ten	  years	  
when	  it	  gradually	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  alright	  really.	  	  
	  
Apply	  this	  list	  to	  movies,	  rock	  music,	  word	  processors	  and	  mobile	  phones	  to	  work	  out	  how	  
old	  you	  are.	  […]	  We	  no	  longer	  think	  of	  chairs	  as	  technology,	  we	  just	  think	  of	  them	  as	  chairs.	  
But	  there	  was	  a	  time	  when	  we	  hadn’t	  worked	  out	  how	  many	  legs	  chairs	  should	  have,	  how	  
tall	  they	  should	  be,	  and	  they	  would	  often	  “crash”	  when	  we	  tried	  to	  use	  them.	  Before	  long,	  
computers	  will	  be	  as	  trivial	  and	  plentiful	  as	  chairs	  (and	  a	  couple	  of	  decades	  or	  so	  after	  that,	  
as	  sheets	  of	  paper	  or	  grains	  of	  sand)	  and	  we	  will	  cease	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  things.	   (Adams	  
par.	  4)	  
14	   In	   contrast	   to	   a	   view	   that	   seeks	   to	   authenticate	   human	   identity	   using	   only	   one	   side	   of	   the	  
nature/culture	  binary,	  the	  hybridity	  of	  the	  cyborg	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  (as	  Haraway	  argues)	  a	  better	  
operating	  metaphor.	  In	  this	  view,	  we	  exist	  always	  already	  as	  “boundary	  creatures.”	  “The	  dichotomies	  
between	  mind	  and	  body,	  animal	  and	  human,	  organism	  and	  machine,	  public	  and	  private,	  nature	  and	  
culture,	   men	   and	   women,	   primitive	   and	   civilized	   are	   all	   in	   question	   ideologically”	   (Haraway	   163).	  
Haraway	   contends	   moreover	   (with	  McLuhan)	   that	   technological	   prosthetics	   cannot	   be	   considered	  
“external”	   to	   the	   subject.	   Is	   the	   blind	  man’s	   cane	   a	   part	   of	   his	   body	   or	   not?	   The	   cane	   transforms	  
differences	  detected	  at	  its	  tip	  and	  enters	  into	  a	  feedback	  circuit	  with	  the	  body	  just	  like	  nerve	  endings	  
do,	  so	  to	  deny	  it	  bodily	  participation	  would	  seem	  arbitrary.	  The	  inability	  to	  draw	  clear	  lines	  in	  effect	  
produces	  a	  new,	  “uncanny	  body”	  in	  which	  self	  and	  Other	  mingle	  without	  clear	  distinction.	  Haraway’s	  
postmodern	  approach	  to	  the	  human	  subject	  is	  paradigm-­‐mangling;	  it	  does	  not	  just	  suggest	  new	  ways	  
to	   spell	  out	   the	   self/Other	  binary	  but	   rather	  proposes	  a	  new	  grammar,	   a	  new	  ontology	  of	   self	   and	  
Other	  that	  dissolves	  the	  binary	  opposition	  between	  them.	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15 Complicating	   the	   narrator’s	  metaphor	   of	   technology-­‐as-­‐garment	   is	   Kuno’s	   conception	   of	   exactly	  who	  
wears	   that	   garment.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Kuno	   insists	   that	   “Man	   is	   the	   measure”—but	   who	   is	   this	  
“Man,”	  exactly?	   In	  our	  contemporary	  postmodern	  condition	  one	  will	  be	   less	  willing	   than	  Forster	   to	  
accept	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  given	  template	  called	  “Man”	  with	  a	  capital	  “M”	  who	  acts	  as	  an	  originating	  
corporeal	   reference	  point	   for	  calibrating	  our	   rulers.	  Kuno	  himself	  was	  almost	  exterminated	  at	  birth	  
because	   of	   his	   well-­‐developed	   musculature	   (relatively	   speaking).	   But	   is	   this	   muscularly-­‐developed	  
frame	  the	  image	  we	  ought	  to	  consequently	  identify	  with	  “true	  man”?	  What	  Kuno	  calls	  “Man”	  is	  itself	  
only	  one	  style	  of	  mediating	  interface,	  namely,	  the	  naturalized	  interface	  of	  the	  athletic	  body—but	  it’s	  
not	  (as	  Heidegger	  might	  put	  it)	  the	  only	  way	  for	  a	  human	  being	  to	  “be.”	  By	  naturalizing	  the	  athletic	  
body	   as	   “the”	   body,	   Kuno	   in	   effect	   only	   inverts	   the	   binary	   opposition	   between	  Vashti’s	   discarnate	  
identity	   and	   his	   own,	   making	   authentic	   humanity	   equal	   “pure	   corporeality”	   instead	   of	   “pure	  
mentality.” 
16	   Note	   how	   Kuno’s	  myth	   of	   bodily	   purity	   is	   here	   combined	  with	   a	  myth	   of	   racial	   and	   national	   purity:	  
Aelfrid	  was	  a	  ninth-­‐century	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  King	  defending	  Wessex	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  invasion.	  	  
17	  One	  might	  of	  course	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  Kuno	  is	  not	  in	  fact	  merely	  projecting	  anthropomorphic	  
traits	  onto	  the	  natural	  landscape	  here.	  Ecophilosopher	  David	  Abram,	  for	  example,	  might	  argue	  that	  
only	  now	  that	  Kuno	  has	  fallen	  under	  the	  “spell	  of	  the	  sensuous,”	  does	  he	  encounter	  the	  world	  in	  as	  it	  
truly	  is—namely,	  as	  living	  flesh	  open	  to	  the	  reciprocation	  of	  his	  own	  touch.	  See	  Abram’s	  fascinating	  
The	  Spell	  of	  the	  Sensuous.	  
18	  Kuno’s	  predicament	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  that	  faced	  by	  environmental	  writers	  like	  Edward	  Abbey	  in	  Desert	  
Solitaire	   and	   Annie	   Dillard	   in	   Pilgrim	   at	   Tinker	   Creek,	   both	   of	   whom	   were	   seeking	   unmediated	  
contact	  with	  nature,	  and	  who	  ironically	  both	  constructed	  their	  pastoral	  excursions	  precisely	  on	  the	  
mediating	  model	  of	  Thoreau’s	  literary	  work.	  
19	  And	  of	  course,	  my	  use	  of	  the	  singular	  “the”	  for	  “world”	  here	  is	  especially	  problematic.	  It’s	  not	  as	  if	  all	  
interfaces	   simply	   connect	   to	   the	   same	   “real	   world”	   and	   then	  merely	   represent	   it	   differently.	   The	  
interface	   one	   uses	   in	   part	   constructs	   and	   brings	   forth	   the	   very	   world	   in	   question.	   For	   a	   useful	  
discussion	   on	   this	   question	   (and	   which	   relates	   the	   interface	   question	   to	   Francisco	   Varela	   and	  
Humberto	  Maturana’s	  theory	  of	  autopoiesis)	  see	  N.	  Katherine	  Hayles	  and	  Niklas	  Luhmann	  in	  “Theory	  
of	  a	  Different	  Order:	  A	  Conversation	  with	  Katherine	  Hayles	  and	  Niklas	  Luhmann.”	  
20	  A	  specifically	  ecocritical	  concern	  over	  such	  ubiquitous	  technological	  interfaces	  might	  argue	  that	  that	  a	  
mouse-­‐clicking,	  keyboard-­‐tapping	  lifeworld	  makes	  us	  forget	  what	  else	  our	  bodies	  can	  do,	  and	  that	  a	  
push-­‐button	  mode	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  reduces	  us	  to	  something	  less	  than	  human.	  (Proponents	  of	  
posthuman	  integration	  with	  the	  techno-­‐virtual	  would	  on	  the	  contrary	  insist	  that	  such	  closely	  coupled	  
technological	   interfaces	   make	   us	   more	   human,	   not	   less.)	   Perhaps	   both	   are	   true.	   As	   elements	  
entering	   (for	   example)	   the	   feedback	   loop	   of	   web	   navigation,	   our	   bodies	   find	   themselves	  
simultaneously	   extended	   and	   truncated:	   we	   can	   travel	   with	   a	   swiftness	   and	   plasticity	   impossible	  
through	   physical	   locomotion,	   but	   our	   corporeal	   body	   is	   reduced	   to	   fragments:	   strained	   eyes	   and	  
tapping	   fingers	   substitute	   for	   a	   bodily	   whole.	   Such	   a	   decorporealized	   cybercultural	   image	   is,	   of	  
course,	   much	   like	   that	   of	   Vashti.	   It’s	   precisely	   this	   sort	   of	   mechanized	   body	   that	   environmental	  
writers	   like	   Edward	   Abbey	   dread,	   because	   for	   them	   such	  mediations	   by	   definition	   imply	   a	   loss	   of	  
contact	  with	  the	  real.	  
21	   Robotic	   exoskeletons—mechanical	   suits	   that	   enable	   wearers	   to	   travel	   by	   foot	   through	   mechanical	  
means	   and	   to	   carry	   hundreds	   of	   pounds	  with	  mechanized	   hands—are	   already	   in	   full	   development	  
(though	  they	  are	  not,	  as	  yet,	  quite	  as	   fancy	  as	   the	  ones	  apotheosized	   in	   the	  recent	   films	   Iron	  Man,	  
District	  9,	  or	  Avatar).	  In	  my	  home	  town	  of	  Salt	  Lake	  City,	  the	  company	  Sarcos	  has	  developed	  a	  line	  of	  
robotic	  exoskeletons	  for	  lifting	  heavy	  cargo;	  see	  a	  fascinating	  (and	  somewhat	  disturbing)	  video	  of	  one	  
in	  action	  here:	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYWd2C3XVIk	  Berkeley	  Bionics	   recently	  unveiled	  
fully-­‐functioning	   “exohiker”	   and	   “exoclimber”	   suits,	  which	   allow	  users	   to	   hike	   and	   climb	  wearing	   a	  
machine-­‐powered	  exoskeleton	  that	  amplifies	  a	  user’s	  muscle-­‐movement:	  
	   http://www.berkeleybionics.com	  
	   	   Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  2(1)	  January	  2010	  
	  
Technology	  and	  the	  Fleshly	  Interface	  in	  Forster’s	  “The	  Machine	  Stops”	  (33-­54)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
53	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  By	  stating,	  “I	  exercised”	  (106),	  Kuno	  also	  counters	  another	  insidious	  dystopian	  threat:	  verbs	  of	  agency	  
had	  heretofore	  been	  largely	  reserved	  for	  the	  Machine	  (Seabury	  64).	  
23	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  little-­‐known	  fact	  that,	  with	  practice,	   it	   is	  actually	  physically	  possible	  for	  the	  
nearsighted	  to	  exercise	  their	  eyes	  and	  thereby	  strengthen	  muscles	  in	  order	  to	  see	  better—at	  least	  to	  
some	  degree.	  But	  almost	  nobody	  does	   that.	  Those	  of	  us	  who	   lack	  20/20	  vision	   instead	   just	   correct	  
such	   problems	   with	   the	   optical	   technologies	   of	   eyeglasses,	   contact	   lenses,	   or	   laser	   surgery.	   Now	  
extend	   the	  notion	  of	   “technological	   correction”	   further.	  What	  will	  happen	  when	   in	   the	  near	   future	  
each	  of	  us	  can	  be	  fitted	  with	  an	  affordably	  priced	  mechanical	  exoskeleton	  like	  I	  mentioned	  earlier?	  At	  
that	  stage,	  what	  will	  be	   the	  point	  of	  exercising	  our	  actual	  muscles	  when	  we	  can	   instead	  use	  servo-­‐
motors	   as	   correctives	   that	   not	   only	   compensate,	   but	   amplify	   our	   strength?	   Is	   there	   any	   essential	  
difference	   between	   correction	   through	   eyeglasses	   and	   muscular	   amplification	   via	   a	   mechanical	  
exoskeleton	  here?	  If	  it	  is	  “authentic”	  to	  view	  landscapes	  through	  prescription	  lenses	  and	  to	  traverse	  
terrain	  wearing	  Gortex	  boots,	  then	  why	  might	  it	  be	  “inauthentic”	  to	  travel	  with	  motor-­‐powered	  thigh-­‐
muscles?	   Although	   some	   theorists	   might	   argue	   that	   the	   exertion	   of	   effort	   is	   what	   distinguishes	  
authentic	   from	   inauthentic	   encounters	   with	   the	   landscape	   here,	   I	   would	   contend	   that	   such	   a	  
characterization	   at	   best	   only	   accounts	   for	   part	   of	   the	   explanation.	   (No	   one	   considers	   squinting	   in	  
order	  to	  see	  better	  as	  heroic,	  for	  example.)	  
24	  For	  example,	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  Forster’s	  equation	  of	  machine	  with	  mentality,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  how	  
much	  more	   embodied	   computer	   interfaces	   have	   in	   fact	   become	   in	   recent	   years.	   Videogames	   like	  
Dance	  Dance	  Revolution	  and	  Rock	  Band,	   as	  well	   as	  Nintendo’s	  Wii	   console,	  make	  use	  of	   interfaces	  
that	   require	   physical	   exertion	   from	   the	   player	   in	   order	   to	   perform	   actions	   represented	   in	   virtual	  
spaces.	  
25	  For	  a	  stirring	  example	  of	  how	  a	  technological	   interface	  with	  the	  natural	  world	  can	  reduce	  nature	  to	  a	  
mirror	   of	   ourselves,	   see	   Lowell	   Monke,	   “Charlotte’s	   Webpage:	   Why	   Children	   Shouldn't	   Have	   the	  
World	  at	  Their	  Fingertips.”	  For	  recent	  work	  on	  connections	  between	  narcissism	  and	  cyberspace,	  see	  
Kevin	  Robins,	  “Cyberspace	  and	  the	  World	  We	  Live	  In.”	  	  
26	   In	   this	   way,	   McLuhan	   further	   troubles	   20th	   century	   debates	   in	   critical	   theory	   about	   the	   difficulties	  
involved	   in	   constructing	   self	   and	   Other.	  With	   “Narcissus	   as	   Narcosis,”	  McLuhan	   (probably	   without	  
knowing	  it)	  intriguingly	  inverts	  Lacan.	  In	  Lacan’s	  “mirror	  stage,”	  the	  infant	  mistakenly	  identifies	  as	  self	  
what	   is	   actually	   an	   Other	   (i.e.,	   an	   image).	   In	   “Narcissus	   as	   Narcosis,”	   one	  mistakenly	   identifies	   as	  
Other	  what	  is	  actually	  the	  self	  (i.e.,	  a	  technological	  product).	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